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Abstract
A device-independent randomness expansion protocol aims to take an initial random seed and generate
a longer one without relying on details of how the devices operate for security. A large amount of work
to date has focussed on a particular protocol based on spot-checking devices using the CHSH inequality.
Here we show how to derive randomness expansion rates for a wide range of protocols, with security
against a quantum adversary. Our technique uses semidefinite programming and a recent improvement of
the entropy accumulation theorem. To support the work and facilitate its use, we provide code that can
generate lower bounds on the amount of randomness that can be output based on the measured quantities
in the protocol. As an application, we give a protocol that robustly generates up to two bits of randomness
per entangled qubit pair, which is twice that established in existing analyses of the spot-checking CHSH
protocol in the low noise regime.
1 Introduction
Random numbers are an essential resource in the information processing era, finding applications in gaming,
simulations and cryptography. Cryptographic protocols are frequently built upon an assumption of access
to a private random seed. Using poor-quality randomness can be fatal to the security of the protocol (see,
e.g., [1]). Thus, in order to adhere to these standard protocol assumptions, it is imperative that we are able
to certify the generation of private random numbers.
The intrinsic randomness of quantum theory provides a natural mechanism with which we can generate
random numbers: a simple source of perfectly random bits could be a device that prepares a σx eigenstate
and then measures σz. However, the use of such a source comes with a significant caveat: the internal mech-
anisms of the preparation and measurement devices must be well-characterized and kept stable throughout
their use. Any mismatch between the characterization and how the device operates in practice may be an ex-
ploitable weakness in the hands of a smart enough adversary; such mismatches have been used to compromise
commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD) systems (see e.g., [2]).
While weaknesses caused by mismatches may be mitigated by increasingly detailed descriptions of the
quantum devices, generating such descriptions rapidly becomes unwieldy and remaining vulnerabilities can
be difficult to detect. This is reminiscent of the situation in modern software engineering where security
flaws are frequently discovered and patched. Fixing hardware vulnerabilities, such as those exploited in the
aforementioned QKD attacks, can be more difficult logistically and economically.
Fortunately, quantum theory provides a means to address this problem. Going back to [3] and using
an important insight of [4], device-independent quantum cryptography establishes security independently of
the devices involved within a protocol, relying only on the validity of quantum theory and the imposition of
certain no-signalling constraints between devices. Security is subsequently verified through the observation
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of non-local output statistics, which in turn act as witnesses to the inner workings of the devices. Limiting
the number of initial assumptions greatly reduces the threat of side-channel attacks.
In this work we focus on the task of randomness expansion: a procedure wherein one attempts to transform
a short private seed into a much larger (still private) source of uniform random bits. Randomness expansion
in a device-independent setting was proposed in [5, 6] with further development and experimental testing
following shortly after [7]. Subsequent work provided security proofs against classical adversaries [8, 9].
Security against quantum adversaries—who may share entanglement with the internal state of the device—
came later [10–12], progressively increasing in noise-tolerance and generality, with the recently introduced
entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) [13,23], on which our work is based, providing asymptotically optimal
rates [14,15]. A new proof technique that is also asymptotically optimal has recently appeared [16].
In [14] the EAT was applied to the task of randomness expansion and a general entropy accumulation
procedure was detailed. The security of the resulting randomness expansion protocol relies on the construction
of a randomness bounding function (known as a min-tradeoff function) that characterizes the average entropy
gain during the protocol. Unfortunately, the analysis in [14] applies only to protocols based on the CHSH
inequality, and relies on some analytic steps that do not directly generalize to arbitrary protocols1. However,
as was also noted in [14], one could look to use the device-independent guessing probability (DIGP) [20–22]
in conjunction with the semidefinite hierarchy [18,19] to obtain computational constructions of the required
min-tradeoff functions.
Here we detail a precise method for combining these semidefinite programming tools with the EAT to
construct min-tradeoff functions. We then apply this construction to the task of randomness expansion to
prove security of protocols based upon arbitrary nonlocal games. This includes protocols with arbitrary
(but finite) numbers of inputs-outputs, as well as protocols based upon multiple Bell-inequalities [17]. It
is worth noting that this construction could also be readily extended to multipartite scenarios although we
do not discuss these in this work. Moreover, as this computational method takes the form of a semidefinite
program these constructions are both computationally efficient and reliable, although at the cost of producing
potentially suboptimal bounds. To accompany this work, we provide a code package (available at [24]) for
the construction and analysis of these randomness expansion protocols.
In more detail, we give a template protocol, Protocol QRE, from which a user can develop their randomness
expansion protocol. Given certain parameters chosen by a user, e.g., time constraints, choice of non-locality
tests and security tolerances, the projected randomness expansion rates to be calculated. If these rates are
unsatisfactory, then modifications to the protocol’s design can be made and the rates recalculated. As the
computations can be done with a computationally efficient procedure, the user can optimize their protocol
parameters to best fit their experimental setup. Once a choice of experimental design has been made, the
resulting randomness expansion procedure can be performed. Subject to the protocol not aborting, this gives
a certifiably private random bit-string.
We apply our technique to several example protocols. In particular, we look at randomness expansion
using the complete empirical distribution as well as a simple extension of the CHSH protocol, showing noise-
tolerant rates of up to two bits per entangled qubit pair, secure against quantum adversaries. Although
means of generating two bits of randomness per entangled qubit pair have been considered before [25] to
the best of our knowledge our work is the first to present a full protocol and prove that this rate can be
robustly achieved taking into account finite statistics. The nonlocal game we use for this is related to that
in [25]. We also compare the achievable rates for these protocols to the protocol presented in [14] which is
based upon a direct von Neumann entropy bound. Our comparison demonstrates that some of the protocols
from the framework are capable of achieving higher rates than the protocol of [14], in both the low and
high noise regimes. Improved rates in the high noise regime are of particular importance when considering
current experimental implementations, because of the difficulty of significantly violating the CHSH inequality
while closing the detection loophole [26–28]. Additionally, we include in the appendices a full non-asymptotic
account of input randomness necessary for running the protocols.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sec. 2 we introduce the material relevant for our construction.
In Sec. 3 we detail the various components of our framework and present the template protocol with full
security statements and proofs. We provide examples of several randomness expansion protocols built within
our framework in Sec. 4 before concluding with some open problems in Sec. 5.
1In particular, simplifications that arise due to the two party, two input, two output scenario being reducible to qubits.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 General notation
Throughout this work, the calligraphic symbols A, B, X and Y denote finite alphabets and we use the
notational shorthand AB to denote the Cartesian product alphabet A × B. We refer to a behaviour (or
strategy) on these alphabets as some conditional probability distribution, (p(a, b|x, y))ab|xy with abxy ∈
ABXY, which we view as a vector p ∈ R|ABXY|. That is, by denoting the set of canonical bases vectors of
R|ABXY| by {eab|xy}abxy, we write p =
∑
abxy p(a, b|x, y)eab|xy. We make the distinction between the vector
and its elements through the use of boldface, i.e., p(a, b|x, y) = p · eab|xy. Throughout this work we assume
that all conditional distributions obey the no-signalling constraints that
∑
a∈A p(a, b|x, y) is independent of
x and hence can be written p(b|y) and similarly ∑b∈B p(a, b|x, y) = p(a|x). We denote the set of all no-
signalling behaviours by PAB|XY ⊂ R|ABXY|. Given an alphabet C we denote the set of all distributions
over C by PC , and given a sequence C = (ci)ni=1, with ci ∈ C for each i = 1, . . . , n, we denote the frequency
distribution induced by C by
FC(x) =
∑n
i=1 δxci
n
, (1)
where δab is the Kronecker delta on the set C.
We use the symbol H to denote a Hilbert space, subscripting with system labels when helpful. For a
system E, we denote the set of positive semidefinite operators with unit trace acting on HE by S(E) and
its subnormalized extension (i.e., the set that arises when the trace is restricted to be in the interval [0, 1])
by S˜(E) (we extend the use of tildes to other sets to denote their subnormalized extensions). We refer to a
state ρXE ∈ S(XE) as a classical-quantum state (cq-state) on the joint system XE if it can be written in
the form ρXE =
∑
x p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE where {|x〉}x is a set of orthonormal vectors in HX . Letting Ω ⊆ X be
an event on the alphabet X , we define the conditional state (conditioned on the event Ω) by
ρXE|Ω =
1
Pr [Ω]
∑
x∈Ω
p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE . (2)
We denote the identity operator of a system E by 1E . We write the natural logarithm as ln(·) and the
logarithm base 2 as log(·). The function sgn : R → {−1, 0, 1} is the sign function, mapping all positive
numbers to 1, negative numbers to −1 and 0 to 0.
We say that a behaviour p ∈ PAB|XY is quantum if its elements can be written in the form p(a, b|x, y) =
Tr
[
ρAB(Na|x ⊗Mb|y)
]
where ρAB ∈ S(HA⊗HB) and {{Na|x}a∈A}x∈X , {{Mb|y}b∈B}y∈Y are sets of POVMs;
we denote the set of all quantum behaviours by Q. Additionally, we use Q˜ to denote the subnormalized
extension of this set.
Note that randomness expansion is a single-party protocol; there is one user who wishes to expand an
initial private random string. However, that user may work with a bipartite setup in which they use two
devices that are prevented from signalling to one another; in such a case we sometimes refer to Alice and Bob
as the users of each device. Note though that, unlike in QKD, Alice and Bob are agents of the same party
and are within the same laboratory. There may also be a dishonest party, Eve, trying to gain information
about the random outputs.
2.2 Entropies and SDPs
The von Neumann entropy of ρ ∈ S(A) is
H(A)ρ := −Tr [ρ log(ρ)] . (3)
For a bipartite state ρAE ∈ S(AE), we use the notation ρE for TrA [ρAE ] and define the conditional von
Neumann entropy of system A given system E when the joint system is in state ρAE by
H(A|E)ρ := H(AE)ρ −H(E)ρ . (4)
In addition, for a tripartite system ρABE ∈ S(ABE), the conditional mutual information between A and B
given E is defined by
I(A : B|E)ρ = H(A|BE)ρ −H(A|E)ρ .
3
We drop the state subscript whenever the state is clear from the context.
In this work it is useful to consider the conditional min-entropy [30] in its operational formulation [22].
Given a cq-state ρXE =
∑
x p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE , the maximum probability with which an agent holding system
E can guess the outcome of a measurement on X is
pguess(X|E) := max{Mx}x
∑
x
p(x)Tr [Mxρ
x
E ] , (5)
where the maximum is taken over all POVMs {Mx}x on system E. Using this we can define the min-entropy
of a classical system given quantum side information as
Hmin(X|E) := − log (pguess(X|E)) . (6)
The final entropic quantity we consider is the -smooth min-entropy [31]. Given some  ≥ 0 and ρXE ∈
S(XE), the -smooth min-entropy Hmin is defined as the supremum of the min-entropy over all states -close
to ρXE ,
Hmin(X|E)ρ := sup
ρ′∈B(ρ)
Hmin(X|E)ρ′ , (7)
where B(ρ) is the -ball centred at ρ defined with respect to the purified trace distance [32]. For a thorough
overview of smooth entropies and their properties we refer the reader to [33].
In the device-independent scenario we do not know the quantum states or measurements being performed.
Instead, our entire knowledge about these must be inferred from the observed input-output behaviour of the
devices used. In particular, observing correlations that violate a Bell inequality provides a coarse-grained
characterization of the underlying system. In a device-independent protocol, the idea is to use only this to
infer bounds on particular system quantities, e.g., the randomness present in the outputs. As formulated
above, the guessing probability (5) is not a device-independent quantity because its computation requires
knowing ρxE . However, the guessing probability can be reformulated in a device-independent way [17,20,21,34]
as we now explain.
Consider a tripartite system ρABE shared between two devices in the user’s lab and Eve. Because we
are assuming an adversary limited by quantum theory, we can suppose that, upon receiving some inputs
(x, y) ∈ XY, the devices work by performing measurements {Ea|x}a and {Fb|y}b respectively, which give rise
to some probability distribution p ∈ QAB|xy, and overall state
σx,yABE =
∑
ab
|a〉〈a| ⊗ |b〉〈b| ⊗ ρ˜abxyE ,
where TrAB
[
(Ea|x ⊗ Fb|y ⊗ 1E)ρABE
]
= ρ˜abxyE , and p(a, b|x, y) = Tr
[
ρ˜abxyE
]
. Note that the user of the
protocol is not aware of what the devices are doing.
Consider the best strategy for Eve to guess the value of AB using her system E. She can perform a
measurement on her system to try to distinguish {ρabxyE }ab (occurring with probability p(a, b|x, y)). Denoting
Eve’s POVM {Mc}c with outcomes in one-to-one correspondence with the values AB can take (say cab being
the value corresponding to a best guess of AB = (a, b))2, then given some values of a, b, x and y, Eve’s
outcomes are distributed as p(ca′b′ |a, b, x, y) = Tr
[
Mca′b′ρ
abxy
E
]
, and her probability of guessing correctly
is p(cab|a, b, x, y) = Tr
[
Mcabρ
abxy
E
]
. Hence, the overall probability of guessing AB correctly given E and
XY = (x, y) for the quantum realisation of the statistics, q = {ρABE , {Ea|x}, {Fb|y}}, is
pguess(AB|x, y, E, q) = sup
{Mc}c
∑
ab
Tr
[
(Ea|x ⊗ Fb|y ⊗Mcab)ρABE
]
= sup
{Mc}c
∑
ab
p(a, b, cab|x, y, q)
= sup
{Mc}c
∑
ab
p(cab|a, b, x, y, q)p(a, b|x, y, q) .
2Without loss of generality we can assume Eve’s measurement has as many outcomes as what she is trying to guess.
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Note that the guessing probability depends on the inputs x, y. In the protocols we consider later, there will
only be one pair of inputs for which Eve is interested in guessing the outputs. We denote these inputs by x˜
and y˜.
In the device-independent scenario, Eve can also optimize over all quantum states and measurements
that could be used by the devices. However, she wants to do so while restricting the devices to obey certain
relations which depend on the protocol (for example, the CHSH violation that could be observed by the user).
For the moment, without specifying these relations precisely, call the set of quantum states and measurements
obeying these relations R. Hence, we seek
pguess(AB|x˜, y˜, E) = sup
q∈R,{Mc}c
∑
ab
p(a, b|x˜, y˜, q)p(cab|a, b, x˜, y˜, q) .
Because Eve’s measurement commutes with those of the devices, due to no signalling we can use Bayes’
rule to rewrite the optimization as3
sup
q∈R,{Mc}c
∑
ab
p(cab|x˜, y˜, q)p(a, b|cab, x˜, y˜, q) .
With this rewriting it is evident that we can think about Eve’s strategy as follows: Eve randomly chooses a
value of C and then prepares the device according to that choice, i.e., trying to bias A,B towards the values
a, b corresponding to the chosen c.
We can hence write
pguess(AB|x˜, y˜, E) = sup
{pc}c
∑
ab
Pr [C = cab] pcab(a, b|x˜, y˜, q) ,
where
∑
c p(c)pc satisfies some relations (equivalent to the restriction to the set R) and pc ∈ QAB|XY for each
c. Provided the relations satisfied are linear, which we will henceforth assume, they can be expressed as a
matrix equation Wp = ω and the whole optimization is a conic program (the set of un-normalized quantum-
realisable distributions forms a convex cone). By writing Pr [C = c]pc as the subnormalized distribution p˜c
the problem can be expressed as
sup
{p˜c}c
∑
ab
p˜cab(a, b|x˜, y˜)
subj. to
∑
c
Wp˜c = ω
p˜c ∈ Q˜AB|XY ∀ c .
(8)
Note that the normalisation condition,
∑
abc p˜c(a, b|x˜, y˜) = 1, is assumed to be contained within (or a con-
sequence of) the conditions imposed by W . For the particular sets of conditions that we impose later,
normalization always follows.
Optimizing over the set of quantum correlations is a difficult problem, in part because the dimension
of the quantum system achieving the optimum could be arbitrarily large. Because of this, we consider a
computationally tractable relaxation of the problem, by instead optimizing over distributions within some
level of the semidefinite hierarchy [18, 19]. We denote the kth level by Q˜(k). This relaxation of the problem
takes the form of a semidefinite program that can be solved in an efficient manner, at the expense of possibly
not obtaining the same optimum value. The corresponding relaxed program is
p(k)guess(ω) := sup
{p˜c}c
∑
ab
p˜cab(a, b|x˜, y˜)
subj. to
∑
c
Wp˜c = ω
p˜c ∈ Q˜(k) ∀ c .
(9)
3This rewriting makes sense provided no information leaks to Eve during the protocol, which is reasonable for randomness
expansion since it takes place in one secure lab.
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This program has a dual. In Appendix D we show that there is an alternative program with the same
properties4 as the standard dual. To specify this, we define the set V(k) of valid constraint vectors at level k
by the set of vectors ν for which there exists p ∈ Q(k) such that Wp = ν.
The alternative dual then takes the form
d(k)guess(ω) := inf
λ
λ · ω
subj. to p(k)guess(ν) ≤ λ · ν, ∀ ν ∈ V(k),
(10)
with λ ∈ R‖ω‖0 . Since the NPA hierarchy forms a sequence of outer approximations to the set of quantum
correlations, Q1 ⊇ Q2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Q, the relaxed guessing probability provides an upper bound on the true
guessing probability, i.e., pguess(ω) ≤ p(k)guess(ω). Combined with (6), one can use the relaxed programs to
compute valid device-independent lower bounds on Hmin.
Programs (9) and (10) are parameterized by a vector ω. We denote a feasible point of the dual program
parameterized by ω by λω. Note that for our later analysis we only need λω to be a feasible point of the
dual program, we do not require it to be optimal.5
2.3 Devices and nonlocal games
Device-independent protocols involve a series of interactions with some untrusted devices. A device D refers to
some physical system that receives classical inputs and produces classical outputs. Furthermore, we say that
D is untrusted if the mechanism by which D produces the outputs from the inputs need not be characterized.
During the protocol, the user interacts with their untrusted devices within the following scenario:6
1. The protocol is performed within a secure lab from which information can be prevented from leaking.
2. This lab can be partitioned into disconnected sites (one controlled by Alice and one by Bob).
3. The user can send information freely between these sites without being overheard, while at the same
time, they can prevent unwanted information transfer between the sites.7
4. The user has two devices to which they can provide inputs (taken from alphabets X and Y) and receive
outputs (from alphabets A and B).
5. These devices operate according to quantum theory, i.e., pAB|XY ∈ QAB|XY . Any eavesdropper is also
limited by quantum theory8. We use DABE to denote the collection of devices (including any held by
an eavesdropper) and refer to this as an untrusted device network.
6. The user has an initial source of private random numbers and a trusted device for classical information
processing.
One of the key advantages of a device-independent protocol is that because no assumptions are made on
the inner workings of the devices used, the protocol checks that the devices are working sufficiently well on-
the-fly. The protocols hence remain impervious to many side-channel attacks, malfunctioning devices or prior
tampering. The idea behind their security is that by testing that the devices exhibit ‘nonlocal’ correlations,
their internal workings are sufficiently restricted to enable the task at hand.
In this work, we formulate the testing of the devices through nonlocal games. A nonlocal game is initiated
by a referee who sends the two players their own question chosen according to some distribution, µ. The
players then respond with their answers chosen from A and B respectively. Using the predefined scoring
rule V , the referee then announces whether or not they won the game. The game is referred to as nonlocal
4In particular, the weak duality statement holds.
5An optimal choice of λ for (10) may not even exist.
6One does not have to recreate this scenario exactly in order to perform the protocol. Instead, the given scenario establishes
one situation in which the protocol remains secure (see Def. 2.2 for a precise definition of security).
7In this work we need to ensure that the user’s devices are unable to communicate at certain points of the protocol (when
Bell tests are being done), but not at others (e.g., when entanglement is being distributed). However, they should never be
allowed to send any information outside the lab after the protocol begins.
8In parts of this paper we allow the eavesdropper limited additional power—the bounds will then still apply if the eavesdropper
is limited by quantum theory.
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because prior to receiving their questions, the players are separated and unable to communicate until they
have given their answers. The question sets, answer sets, distribution µ and the scoring rule V are all public
knowledge. Moreover, the players are allowed to confer prior to the start of the game.
Definition 2.1: Let A,B,X ,Y and V be finite sets. A (two-player) nonlocal game G = (µ, V ) (on ABXY)
consists of a set of question pairs (x, y) ∈ XY chosen according to some probability distribution µ : XY →
[0, 1], a set of answer pairs (a, b) ∈ AB and a scoring function V : ABXY → V. A strategy for G is a
conditional distribution p ∈ PAB|XY defined on the question and answer sets.
Remark 2.1: We will abuse notation and use the symbol G to refer to both the nonlocal game and the set
of possible scores. I.e., we may refer to the players receiving a score c ∈ G. Furthermore, we denote the
number of different scores by |G|.
If the players play G using the strategy p, then this induces a frequency distribution ωG over the set of
possible scores. That is,
ωG(c) =
∑
abxy
µ(x, y)p(a, b|x, y) δV (a,b,x,y),c (11)
for each c ∈ G. The expected frequency distribution, ωG , will be the figure of merit by which we evaluate
the performance of our untrusted devices. We denote the set of possible frequency distributions achievable
by the agents whilst playing according to quantum strategies by QG .
Example 2.1 (Extended CHSH game (GCHSH)): The extended CHSH game has appeared already in the
device-independent literature in the context of QKD (see, e.g., [35]). It extends the standard CHSH game
to include a correlation check between one of Alice’s CHSH inputs and an additional input from Bob. It
is defined by the question-answer sets X = {0, 1}, Y = {0, 1, 2} and A = B = {0, 1}, the scoring set
V = {cCHSH, calign, 0} and the scoring rule
VCHSH(a, b, x, y) :=

cCHSH if x · y = a⊕ b and y 6= 2
calign if (x, y) = (0, 2) and a⊕ b = 0
0 otherwise.
(12)
The input distribution we consider is defined by µCHSH(x, y) =
1
8 for (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}2, µCHSH(0, 2) = 12 and
µCHSH(x, y) = 0 otherwise. This game is equivalent to choosing to play either the CHSH game or the game
corresponding to checking the alignment of the inputs (0, 2) uniformly at random and then proceeding with the
chosen game. The frequency distribution then tells us the relative frequencies with which we win each game.
The motivation behind GCHSH can be understood by considering a schematic of an ideal implementation on
a bipartite qubit system as given in Fig. 1. If we observe the maximum winning probability for the CHSH
game, as well as perfect alignment for the inputs (0, 2), then the inputs (x˜, y˜) = (1, 2) should produce two
perfectly uniform bits.
2.4 Device-independent randomness expansion protocols and their security
A device-independent randomness expansion protocol is a procedure by which one attempts to use a uniform,
trusted seed, D, to produce a longer uniform bit-string, Z, through repeated interactions with some untrusted
devices. We consider so-called spot-checking protocols, which involve two round types: test-rounds, during
which one attempts to produce certificates of nonlocality, and generation rounds in which a fixed input is given
to the devices and the outputs are recorded. By choosing the rounds randomly according to a distribution
heavily favouring generation rounds, we are able to reduce the size of the seed whilst sufficiently constraining
the device’s behaviour, guaranteeing the presence of randomness in the outcomes (except with some small
probability).
Using the setup described in Sec. 2.3, our template randomness expansion protocol consists of two main
steps.
1. Accumulation: In this phase the user repeatedly interacts with the separated devices. Each interaction
is randomly chosen to be a generation round or a test round in a coordinated way using the initial
7
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Figure 1: A measurement schematic for a qubit implementation of GCHSH. Measurements are depicted in
the x-z plane of the Bloch-sphere with σϕ = cos(ϕ)σz + sin(ϕ)σx for ϕ ∈ (−pi, pi]. Using the maximally
entangled state |ψ〉AB = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
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, where the scores are ordered (cCHSH, calign, 0). The setup achieves Tsirelson’s
bound for the CHSH game as well as perfect correlations for the X = 0 and Y = 2 inputs. In addition,
self-testing results [38] give a converse result: these scores completely characterize the devices up to local
isometries. This implies that the state used by the devices is uncorrelated with an adversary and that the
measurement pair (X,Y ) = (1, 2) yields uniformly random results, certifying the presence of 2 bits of private
randomness in the outputs.
random seed.9 On generation rounds the devices are provided with some fixed inputs (x˜, y˜) ∈ XY,
whereas during test rounds, the testing procedure specific to the protocol is followed. After many
interactions, the recorded outputs are concatenated to give AB. Using the statistics collected during
test rounds, a decision is made about whether to abort or not based on how close the observations are
to some pre-defined expected device behaviour.
2. Extraction: Subject to the protocol not aborting in the accumulation step, a quantum-proof random-
ness extractor is applied to AB. This maps the partially random AB to a shorter string Z that is the
output of the protocol.
We define security of a randomness expansion protocol according to a composable definition [39–43]. Using
composable security ensures that the output randomness can be used in any other application with only an
arbitrarily small probability of it being distinguishable from perfect randomness. To make this more precise,
consider a hypothetical device that outputs a string Z that is uniform and uncorrelated with any information
held by an eavesdropper. In other words, it outputs τm ⊗ ρE , where τm is the maximally mixed state on m
qubits. The ideal protocol is defined as the protocol that involves first doing the real protocol, then, in the
case of no abort, replacing the output with a string of the same length taken from the hypothetical device.
The protocol is then said to be εsound-secure (εsound is called the soundness error) if, when the user either
implements the real or ideal protocol with probability 12 , the maximum probability that a distinguisher can
guess which is being implemented is at most 1+εsound2 . If εsound is small, then the real and ideal protocols are
virtually indistinguishable. Defining the ideal as above ensures that the real and ideal protocols can never
9For example, a central source of randomness could be used to choose the round type. This information could then be
communicated to each party (in such a way that the devices do not learn this choice).
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be distinguished by whether or not they abort. We refer to [43] for further discussion of composability in a
related context (that of QKD).
There is a second important parameter of any protocol, its completeness error, which is the probability
that an ideal implementation of the protocol leads to an abort. It is important for a protocol to have a
low completeness error in addition to a low soundness error since a protocol that always aborts is vacuously
secure.
Definition 2.2: Consider a randomness expansion protocol whose output is denoted by Z. Let Ω be the
event that the protocol does not abort. The protocol is an (εsound, εcomp)-randomness expansion protocol if
it satisfies the following two conditions.
1. Soundness:
1
2
Pr[Ω] · ‖ρZE − τm ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ εsound, (13)
where E is an arbitrary quantum register (which could have been entangled with the devices used at
the start of the protocol), m is the length of the output string Z and τm is the maximally mixed state
on a system of dimension 2m.
2. Completeness: There exists a set of quantum states and measurements such that if the protocol is
implemented using those
Pr[Ω] ≥ 1− εcomp. (14)
Although we use a composable security definition to ensure that any randomness output by the protocol
can be used in any scenario, importantly, this may not apply if the devices used in the protocol are subse-
quently reused [44]. Thus, after the protocol the devices should be kept shielded and not reused until such
time as the randomness generated no longer needs to be kept secure. How best to resolve this remains an open
problem: the Supplemental Material of [44] presents candidate protocol modifications (and modifications to
the notion of composability) that may circumvent such problems.
2.5 Entropy accumulation
In order to bound the smooth min entropy Hmin(AB|XYE) accumulated during the protocol we employ
the EAT [13, 23]. Roughly speaking, the EAT says that this min-entropy is proportional to the number of
rounds, up to square root correction factors. The proportionality constant is the single-round conditional
von Neumann entropy optimized over all states that can give rise to the observed scores. In its full form, the
EAT is an extension of the asymptotic equipartition property [45] to a particular non-i.i.d. regime. For the
purposes of randomness expansion we only require a special case of the EAT, which we detail later in this
section.
With the goal of maximising our entropic yield, we use the recently improved statement of the entropy
accumulation theorem [23].10 For completeness we present the relevant statements including the accumulation
procedure (see also [15]).
2.5.1 The entropy accumulation procedure
The entropy accumulation procedure prescribes how the user interacts with their untrusted devices and
collects data from them. Before beginning this procedure a nonlocal game G = (µ, V ) that is compatible
with the alphabets of the devices is selected.
A round within the entropy accumulation procedure consists of the user giving an input to each of their
devices and recording the outputs. We use subscripts on random variables to indicate the round that they
are associated with, i.e., XiYi are the random variables describing the joint device inputs for the i
th round.
In addition, boldface will be used to indicate that a random variable represents the concatenation over all n
rounds of the protocol, X = X1X2 . . . Xn.
The accumulation procedure consists of n ∈ N separate interactions with the untrusted devices. We refer
to a single interaction with the devices as a round. A round consists of the user selecting and supplying
inputs to the devices, receiving outputs and recording this data. During the ith round, a random variable
10We discuss this EAT statement and compare it to alternatives in Appendix C.
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Ti ∼ Bernoulli(γ) is sampled, for some fixed γ ∈ (0, 1), indicating whether the round will be a generation
round or a test round. With probability 1− γ we have Ti = 0 and the round is a generation round. During
a generation round, the user supplies the respective devices with the fixed generation inputs (x˜, y˜) ∈ XY,
recording XiYi = (x˜, y˜). They record the outputs received from the devices as Ai and Bi respectively
and they record the round’s score as Ci =⊥. With probability γ, Ti = 1 and the round is a test round.
During a test round, inputs XiYi are sampled according to the distribution specified by the chosen nonlocal
game. The sampled inputs are fed to their respective devices and the outputs received are recorded as
AiBi. The score is computed and recorded as Ci = V (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi). The transcript for round i is the
tuple (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi, Ti, Ci). After n rounds, the complete transcript for the accumulation procedure is
(A,B,X,Y,T,C). We denote by C the set of possible values that Ci can take, i.e. C = G ∪ {⊥}.
After the n-round transcript has been obtained, the user looks to determine the performance of the
untrusted devices and, in turn, certify a lower bound on the total entropy produced, Hmin(AB|XYE). To
this end, the user computes the empirical frequency distribution
FC(c) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δc,Ci . (15)
Prior to the accumulation step, the user fixes some frequency distribution ω corresponding to an expected
(or hoped for) behaviour. Should the devices behave in an i.i.d. manner according to ω, then concentration
bounds tell us that the empirical frequency distribution FC should be close to ω. With this in mind, we
define the event that the protocol does not abort by
Ω = {C | γ(ω(G)− δ) < FC(G) < γ(ω(G) + δ)}, (16)
where δ ∈ (0, 1)|G| is a vector of confidence interval widths satisfying 0 < δ < ω(G) with all vector inequalities
being interpreted as element-wise constraints.
2.5.2 The entropy accumulation theorem
To complete the protocol, uniform randomness needs to be extracted from the partially random outputs.
Doing so requires the user to assume a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy (conditioned on any side
information held by an adversary) contained in the devices’ outputs when the protocol does not abort. If
εsound is very small, then the assumption must be correct with near certainty. The EAT provides a method
by which one can compute such a lower bound. Loosely, the EAT states that if the interaction between
the honest parties occurs in a sequential manner (as described in Sec. 2.5.1), then with high probability the
uncertainty an adversary has about the outputs is close to their total average uncertainty. As a mathematical
statement it is a particular example of the more general phenomenon of concentration of measure (see [46]
for a general overview). In order to state the EAT precisely, we first require a few definitions.
Definition 2.3 (EAT channels): A set of EAT channels {Ni}ni=1 is a collection of trace-preserving and
completely-positive maps Ni : S(Ri−1)→ S(AiBiXiYiCiRi) such that for every i ∈ [n]:
1. Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi and Ci are finite dimensional classical systems, Ri is an arbitrary quantum system and
Ci is the output of a deterministic function of the classical registers Ai, Bi, Xi and Yi.
2. For any initial state ρR0E , the final state ρABXYCE = TrRn [((Nn ◦ · · · ◦ N1)⊗ IE)ρR0E ] fulfils the
Markov chain condition I(Ai−1Bi−1:XiYi|Xi−1Y i−1E) = 0 for every i ∈ [n].
The EAT channels formalise the notion of interaction within the protocol. The first condition in Def. 2.3
specifies the nature of the information present within the protocol and, in particular, it restricts the honest
parties’ inputs to their devices to be classical in nature. The arbitrary quantum register Ri represents
the quantum state stored by the separate devices after the ith round. The second condition specifies the
sequential nature of the protocol. The channels Ni describe the joint action of both devices and include the
generation of the randomness needed to choose the settings. The Markov chain condition implies that the
inputs to the devices presented by the honest parties are conditionally independent of the previous outputs
they have received. Note that by using a trusted private seed to choose the inputs and supplying the inputs
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sequentially (as is done in Sec. 2.5.1), this condition will be satisfied.11 Finally, the adversary is permitted
to hold a purification, E of the initial state shared by the devices, and the state evolves with the sequential
interaction through the application of the sequence of EAT channels.
As explained above, the EAT allows the elevation of i.i.d. analyses to the non-i.i.d. setting. To do so
requires a so-called min-tradeoff function which, roughly speaking, gives a lower bound on the single-round
von Neumann entropy produced by any devices that, on expectation, produce some statistics. In the case of
the EAT these distributions are {FC}C∈Ω, i.e., all frequency distributions induced from score transcripts C
that do not lead to an aborted protocol. The EAT asserts that, under sequential interaction, an adversary’s
uncertainty about the outputs of the non-i.i.d. device will (with high probability) be concentrated within
some interval about the uncertainty produced by these i.i.d. devices. In particular, a lower bound on this
uncertainty can be found by considering the worst-case i.i.d. device.
Definition 2.4 (Min-tradeoff functions): Let {Ni}ni=1 be a collection of EAT channels and let C denote the
common alphabet of the systems C1, . . . , Cn. An affine function f : PC → R is a min-tradeoff function for
the EAT channels {Ni}ni=1 if for each i ∈ [n] it satisfies
f(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=τp
H(AiBi|XiYiR′)Ni(σ), (17)
where τp :=
∑
c∈C p(c) |c〉〈c|, R′ is a register isomorphic to Ri−1 and the infimum over the empty set is taken
to be +∞.
Remark 2.2: As the probability of testing during the protocol is fixed, the expected frequency distributions
will always take the form
p =
(
γω
(1− γ)
)
(18)
for some ω ∈ QG , where p(⊥) is the final element of p. Furthermore, the fixed testing probability means
that any distribution that results in a finite infimum in (17) necessarily takes this form. We shall refer to a
distribution of the form (18) as a protocol-respecting distribution, denoting the set of all such distributions
by Γ.
Particular properties of the min-tradeoff function that appear within the error terms of the EAT are:
• The maximum value attainable on PC ,
Max[f ] := max
p∈PC
f(p). (19)
• The minimum value over protocol-respecting distributions,
Min[f |Γ] := minp∈Γ f(p). (20)
• The maximum variance over all protocol-respecting distributions,
Var[f |Γ] := maxp∈Γ
∑
c∈C
p(c) (f(ec)− f(p))2 . (21)
Theorem 2.1 (EAT [23]):
Let {Ni}ni=1 be a collection of EAT channels and let ρABICE = TrRn [((Nn ◦ · · · ◦ N1)⊗ IE)ρR0E ] be the
output state after the sequential application of the channels {Ni⊗IE}i to some input state ρR0E. Let Ω ⊆ Cn
be some event that occurs with probability pΩ and let ρ|Ω be the state conditioned on Ω occurring. Finally let
11A public seed can also be used if the Markov chain conditions can be shown to hold. However, one may need to be more
careful when dealing with such a scenario. For example, if the entangled states distributed to the devices come from some
third-party source, then it should be clear that the state used within the ith round was prepared independently of the seed used
to generate the inputs Xni+1Y
n
i+1. This could be achieved by choosing inputs Xi+1Yi+1 using a public seed that was generated
after the ith entangled state has been distributed.
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s ∈ (0, 1) and f be a valid min-tradeoff function for {Ni}i. If for all C ∈ Ω, with Pr [C] > 0, there is some
t ∈ R for which f(FC) ≥ t, then for any β ∈ (0, 1)
Hsmin(AB|XYE)ρ|Ω > nt− n(V + K)− Ω, (22)
where
V :=
β ln 2
2
(
log
(
2|AB|2 + 1)+√Var[f |Γ] + 2)2 , (23)
K :=
β2
6(1− β)3 ln 2 2
β(log |AB|+Max[f ]−Min[ f |Γ]) ln3
(
2log |AB|+Max[f ]−Min[ f |Γ] + e2
)
(24)
and
Ω :=
1
β
(1− 2 log(pΩ s)) . (25)
Remark 2.3: As the EAT holds for all β ∈ (0, 1) we can numerically optimize our choice of β once we know
the values of the other protocol parameters. However, for large n and small γ, a short calculation shows that
choosing β ∈ O(√γ/n) keeps all the error terms of approximately the same magnitude. In particular, this
choice results in the error scalings: nV ∈ O(
√
n/γ), nK ∈ O(1) and Ω ∈ O(
√
n/γ).
2.6 Randomness extractors
Subject to the protocol not aborting, the entropy accumulation sub-procedure detailed in Sec. 2.5.1 will
result in the production of some bit string AB ∈ {0, 1}2n with Hsmin(AB|XYE) > k for some k ∈ R. In
order to ‘compress’ this randomness into a shorter but almost uniform random string a seeded, quantum-proof
randomness extractor can be used. This is a function Rext : AB ×D → Z, such that if D is a uniformly
distributed bit-string, the resultant bit-string Z is -close to uniformly distributed, even from the perspective
an adversary with quantum side-information E about AB. More formally, combining [47, Lemma 3.5] with
the standard definition for a quantum-proof randomness extractor [48] gives the following definition.
Definition 2.5 (Quantum-proof strong extractor): A function Rext : {0, 1}|AB| × {0, 1}|D| → {0, 1}|Z| is a
quantum-proof (k, ext + 2s)-strong extractor, if for all cq-states ρABE with H
s
min(AB|E)ρ ≥ k and for some
s > 0 it maps ρABE ⊗ τD to ρ′Rext(AB,D)DE where
1
2
‖ρ′Rext(AB,D)DE − τm ⊗ τ|D| ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ext + 2s . (26)
(Recall that τm is the maximally mixed state on a system of dimension m.)
Although in general the amount of randomness extracted will depend on the extractor, Hsmin(AB|E)
provides an upper bound on the total number of s-close to uniform bits that can be extracted from AB
and a well-chosen extractor will result in a final output bit-string with |Z| ≈ Hsmin(AB|E). We denote any
loss of entropy incurred by the extractor by `ext = k − |Z|. Entropy loss will differ between extractors but
in general it will be some function of the extractor error, the seed length and the initial quantity of entropy.
The extractor literature is rich with explicit constructions, with many following Trevisan’s framework [49].
For an in-depth overview of randomness extraction, we refer the reader to [50] and references therein.
Remark 2.4: By using a strong quantum-proof extractor, the output of the extractor will remain uncorre-
lated with the string used to seed it. Since the seed acts like a catalyst, we need not be overly concerned
with the amount required. Furthermore, if available, it could just be acquired from a trusted public source
immediately prior to extraction without compromising security. However, if a public source is used, it is im-
portant that it is not available to Eve too early in the protocol as this could allow Eve to create correlations
between the outputs of the devices and the extractor seed.
Remark 2.5: Related to the previous remark is the question of whether the quantity we are interested in is
Hsmin(AB|XYE), rather than Hsmin(AB|E) or Hsmin(ABXY|E). In common QKD protocols (such as BB84),
the first of these is the only reasonable choice because the information XY is communicated between the
two parties over an insecure channel and hence could become known by Eve. For randomness expansion, this
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is no longer the case: this communication can all be kept secure within one lab. Whether the alternative
quantities can be used then depends on where the seed randomness comes from. If a trusted beacon is used
then the first case is needed. If the seed randomness can be kept secure until such time that the random
numbers need no longer be kept random then the second quantity could be used12. If it is also desirable to
extract as much randomness as possible, then the third quantity could be used instead. However, in many
protocols the amount of seed required to choose X and Y in the entropy accumulation procedure is small
enough that extracting randomness from this will not significantly increase the rate (see, e.g., our discussion
in Appendix B).
3 A template protocol for randomness expansion
The primary purpose of this work is to provide a method whereby one can construct tailored randomness
expansion protocols, with a guarantee of security and easily calculable generation rates. We achieve this by
providing a template protocol (Protocol QRE), for which we have explicit security statements in terms of the
protocol parameters as well as the outputs of some SDPs. Our framework is divided into three sub-procedures:
preparation, accumulation and extraction.
The preparation procedure consists of assigning values to the various parameters of the protocol, this
includes choosing a nonlocal game to act as the nonlocality test. At the end of the preparation one would
have turned the protocol template into a precise protocol, constructed a min-tradeoff function and be able
to calculate the relevant security quantities. Note that once a specific protocol has been decided it is not
necessary to perform this step. Furthermore, the manufacturer may already specify the entire protocol to
use with their devices, in which case this step can be skipped. Nevertheless, the fact that the protocol can be
tuned to the devices at hand enables the user to optimize the randomness output from the devices at hand.
The final two parts of the framework form the process described in Protocol QRE. The accumulation step
follows the entropy accumulation procedure detailed in Sec. 2.5.1 wherein the user interacts with their devices
using the chosen protocol parameters. After the device interaction phase has finished, the user implicitly
evaluates the quality of their devices by testing whether the observed inputs and outputs satisfy the condition
(16). Subject to the protocol not aborting, a reliable lower bound on the min-entropy of the total output
string is calculated through the EAT (22). With this bound, the protocol can be completed by applying an
appropriate quantum-proof randomness extractor to the devices’ raw output strings.
The next three subsections are dedicated to explaining these three sub-procedures in detail. In particular,
Sec. 3.1 outlines the min-tradeoff function construction. A bound on the total entropy accumulated in terms
of the various protocol parameters is then provided in Sec. 3.2 and finally, in Sec. 3.3, the security statements
for the template protocol are presented.
3.1 Preparation
Before interacting with their devices the user must select appropriate protocol parameters (see Fig. 2 for
a full list of parameters). In particular, they must choose a nonlocal game to use during the test rounds
and construct a corresponding min-tradeoff function. This step enables this to be done if it is not already
specified.
The parameter values chosen will largely be dictated by situational constraints; e.g., runtime, seed length
and the expected performance of the untrusted devices.13 The user’s choice of parameters, in particular
the choice of nonlocal game, will affect the form of their min-tradeoff function derived and in turn their
projected total accumulated entropy. Before moving to the accumulation step of the protocol the user can
try to optimise their chosen parameters by computing the entropy rates for many different choices. This
allows them to adapt their protocol to the projected performance of their devices.
12This is a reasonable requirement, because there are other strings that have to be kept secure in the same way, e.g., the raw
string A.
13At first this may seem to conflict with the ethos of device-independence. The point is that although the user of the protocol
relies on an expected behaviour to set-up their devices, they do not rely on this expected behaviour being an accurate reflection
of the devices for security. This also means that the expected behaviour could be that claimed by the device manufacturer.
Using inaccurate estimation of the devices behaviour will not compromise security, but may lead to a different abort probability.
13
Protocol QRE
Parameters and notation:
DAB – a pair of untrusted devices taking inputs from X , Y and giving outputs from A, B
G = (µ, V ) – a nonlocal game compatible with DAB
ω ∈ QG – an expected frequency distribution for G
δ – vector of confidence interval widths (satisfies 0 ≤ δk ≤ ωk for all k ∈ [|G|])
n ∈ N – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1) – probability of a test round
(x˜, y˜) – distinguished inputs for generation rounds
fmin – min-tradeoff function
ext > 0 – extractor error
s ∈ (0, 1) – smoothing parameter
EAT ∈ (0, 1) – entropy accumulation error
Rext – quantum-proof (k, ext + 2s)-strong extractor
`ext – entropy loss induced by Rext
Procedure:
1: Set i = 1.
2: While i ≤ n:
Choose Ti = 0 with probability 1− γ and otherwise T1 = 1.
If Ti = 0:
Gen: Input (x˜, y˜) into the respective devices, recording the inputs XiYi and outputs AiBi.
Set Ci =⊥ and i = i+ 1.
Else:
Test: Play a single round of G on DAB using inputs sampled from µ, recording the inputs XiYi and
outputs AiBi. Set Ci = V (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi) and i = i+ 1.
3: Compute the empirical frequency distribution FC.
If γ(ω − δ) < FC(G) < γ(ω + δ):
Ext: Apply a strong quantum-proof randomness extractor Rext to the raw output string AB
producing nfmin(ω − δsgn)− `ext bits (ext + 2s)-close to uniformly distributed.
Else:
Abort: Abort the protocol.
Figure 2: The template quantum-secure device-independent randomness expansion protocol.
We now present a constructible family of min-tradeoff functions for a general instance of Protocol QRE.
This construction is based on the following idea. As noted in Sec. 2.2 one can numerically calculate a
lower bound on the min-entropy of a system based on its observed statistics. Pairing this with the relation,
Hmin(X|E) ≤ H(X|E), we have access to numerical bounds on the von Neumann entropy. In particular, we
can use the affine function g(q) = λ ·q, where λ is a feasible point of the dual program (10), in order to build
a min-tradeoff function for the protocol.14 In order for g to meet the requirements of a min-tradeoff function,
its domain must be extended to include the symbol ⊥. To perform this extension we use the method presented
in [23, Section 5.1]. As the rounds are split into testing and generation rounds, we may decompose the EAT-
channel for the ith round as Ni = γN testi + (1 − γ)N geni , where N testi is the channel that would be applied
if the round were a test round and N geni if the round were a generation round. Importantly, this splitting
14In fact, by relaxing the dual program to the NPA hierarchy, the single round bound is valid against super-quantum adver-
saries. However, the full protocol is not necessarily secure more widely: to show that we would need to generalise the EAT and
the extractor.
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separates ⊥ from the nonlocal game scores. That is, if N testi is the channel applied then Pr [Ci =⊥] = 0
whereas if N geni is applied then Pr [Ci =⊥] = 1.
Lemma 3.1 (Min-tradeoff extension [23, Lemma 5.5] ): Let g : PG → R be an affine function satisfying
g(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci=τp
H(AiBi|XiYiR′)Ni(σ) (27)
for all p ∈ QG. Then, the function f : PG∪{⊥} → R, defined by its action on trivial distributions
f(ec) = Max[g] +
g(ec)−Max[g]
γ
, ∀c ∈ G,
f(e⊥) = Max[g],
is a min-tradeoff function for the EAT-channels {Ni}i. Furthermore, f satisfies the following properties:
Max[f ] = Max[g],
Min[f |Γ] ≥ Min[g],
Var[f |Γ] ≤
(Max[g]−Min[g])2
γ
.
Lemma 3.2 (Min-tradeoff construction): Let G be a nonlocal game and k ∈ N. For each ν ∈ Q(k)G , let
λν be a feasible point of Prog. (10) when parameterized by ν. Furthermore, let λmax = maxc∈G λν(c) and
λmin = minc∈G λν(c). Then, for any set of EAT channels {Ni}ni=1 implementing an instance of Protocol QRE
with the nonlocal game G, the set of functionals Fmin(G) = {fν(·) | ν ∈ Q(k)G } forms a family of min-tradeoff
functions, where fν : PC → R are defined by their actions on trivial distributions
fν(ec) := (1− γ)
(
Aν −Bν λν · ec − (1− γ)λmin
γ
)
for c ∈ G, (28)
and
fν(e⊥) := (1− γ) (Aν −Bν λmin) , (29)
where Aν =
1
ln 2 − log(λν · ν) and Bν = 1λν ·ν ln 2 .
Moreover, these min-tradeoff functions satisfy the following relations.
• Maximum:
Max[fν ] = (1− γ)(Aν −Bν λmin) (30)
• Γ-Minimum:
Min[fν |Γ] ≥ (1− γ)(Aν −Bν λmax) (31)
• Γ-Variance:
Var[fν |Γ] ≤
(1− γ)2B2ν(λmax − λmin)2
γ
(32)
Proof. Consider the entropy bounding property (27) but with C restricted to the scoring alphabet of G, i.e.,
we have an affine function gν : PG → R such that
gν(q) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci(G)=τq
H(AiBi|XiYiR′)Ni(σ),
for all q ∈ QG .
As conditioning on additional side information will not increase the von Neumann entropy, we may
condition on whether or not the round was a test round,
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H(AiBi|XiYiR′)Ni(σ) ≥ H(AiBi|XiYiTiR′)Ni(σ)
= γH(AiBi|XiYi, Ti = 1, R′)Ni(σ) + (1− γ)H(AiBi|XiYi, Ti = 0, R′)Ni(σ)
> (1− γ)H(AiBi|Xi = x˜, Yi = y˜, Ti = 0, R′)Ni(σ)
where in the final line we have used the fact that the inputs are fixed for generation rounds. As the min-
entropy lower bounds the von Neumann entropy, we arrive at the bound
H(AiBi|XiYiR′)Ni(σ) > (1− γ)Hmin(AiBi|Xi = x˜, Yi = y˜, Ti = 0, R′)Ni(σ).
Using programs (9) and (10), we can lower bound the right-hand side in terms of the relaxed guessing
probability. Specifically, for a single generation round
Hmin(AB|X = x˜, Y = y˜, T = 0, R′) = − log(pguess(q))
≥ − log(λ(k)ν · q),
holds for all k ∈ N, any ν ∈ Q(k)G and any quantum system realising the expected statistics q ∈ QG . In the
final line we used the monotonicity of the logarithm together with the fact that a solution to the relaxed dual
program, for any parameterization ν ∈ Q(k)G , provides a linear function λν · ( · ) that is greater than pguess
everywhere on Q(k)G . Note that this bound is also device-independent and is therefore automatically a bound
on the infimum. Dropping the superscript (k) for notational ease, we may recover the desired affine property
by taking a first order expansion about the point ν. This results in the function
gν(q) := (1− γ)(Aν −Bν λν · q),
which satisfies
gν(q) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci=τq
H(AiBi|XiYiR′)Ni(σ),
for all q ∈ QG , with Aν and Bν as defined in Lemma 3.2. The statement then follows by applying Lemma 3.1
to gν , noting Max[gν ] = (1− γ)(Aν −Bν λmin) and Min[gν ] = (1− γ)(Aν −Bν λmax).
Example 3.1: Taking the nonlocal game GCHSH introduced in Example 2.1, we can use the above lemma
to construct a min-tradeoff function. Fixing the probability of testing, γ = 5 × 10−3, we consider a device
that behaves (during a test round) according to the expected frequency distribution ω = (ωalign, ωCHSH, 1−
ωalign − ωCHSH). In Fig. 3, we plot the certifiable min-entropy of a single generation round for a range of
ω. We see that as the scores approach ω = 12
(
1, 2+
√
2
4 ,
2−√2
4
)
, we are able to certify almost15 two bits of
randomness per entangled qubit pair using GCHSH.
3.2 Accumulation and extraction
After fixing the parameters of the protocol and constructing a min-tradeoff function fmin, the user proceeds
with the remaining steps of Protocol QRE: accumulation and extraction. The accumulation step consists of
the device interaction and evaluation sub-procedures that were detailed in Sec. 2.5.1. If the protocol does not
abort, then with high probability the generated string AB contains at least some given quantity of smooth
min-entropy. The following lemma applies the EAT to deduce a lower bound on the amount of entropy
accumulated.
Lemma 3.3 (Accumulated entropy): Let the randomness expansion procedure and all of its parameters be as
defined in Fig. 2. Furthermore, let Ω be the event the protocol does not abort (cf. (16)) and let ρ|Ω be the final
state of the system conditioned on this. Then, for any β, s, EAT ∈ (0, 1) and any choice of min-tradeoff
function fν ∈ Fmin, either Protocol QRE aborts with probability greater than 1− EAT or
Hsmin(AB|XYE)ρ|Ω > (1− γ)n (Aν −Bνλν · (ω − δsgn))− n(V + K)− Ω, (33)
15Due to the infrequent testing we are actually only able to certify a maximum of 2 · (1− γ) bits per interaction.
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Figure 3: A plot of a lower bound on the certifiable min-entropy produced during a single round of the
protocol. This lower bound was calculated using Prog. 9 relaxed to the second level of the NPA hierarchy.
In addition, we plot a min-tradeoff function fν evaluated for distributions of the form p = (γω, 1 − γ) for
ω ∈ QG , i.e. expected frequency distributions over G ∪ {⊥} that are compatible with the spot-checking
structure of the rounds. Since fν is the tangent plane to the surface at the point ν it forms an affine lower
bound on the min-entropy of any quantum distribution compatible with the protocol.
where
V :=
β ln 2
2
(
log
(
2|AB|2 + 1)+√ (1− γ)2B2ν(λmax − λmin)2
γ
+ 2
)2
, (34)
K :=
β2
6(1− β)3 ln 2 2
β(log |AB|+(1−γ)Bν(λmax−λmin)) ln3
(
2log |AB|+(1−γ)Bν(λmax−λmin) + e2
)
, (35)
Ω :=
1
β
(1− 2 log(EAT s)) (36)
and δsgn = (δ(c) sgn(−λν(c)))c∈G.
Proof. Let {Ni}i∈[n] be the set of channels implementing the entropy accumulation sub-procedure of Proto-
col QRE. Comparing this procedure with the definition of the EAT channels Def. 2.3, we have Ni : S(Ri−1)→
S(AiBiXiYiTiCiRi) with Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi, Ti, Ci finite dimensional classical systems, Ri an arbitrary quantum
system and the score Ci is a deterministic function of the values of the other classical systems. Furthermore,
the inputs to the protocol for the ith round, (Xi, Yi, Ti), are chosen independently of all other systems in the
protocol and so the conditional independence constraints I(Ai−11 B
i−1
1 :XiYi|Xi−11 Y i−11 E) = 0 hold trivially.
The conditions necessary for {Ni}i∈[n] to be EAT-channels are satisfied and by Lemma 3.2 fν is a min-tradeoff
function for these channels. We can now apply the EAT to bound the total entropy accumulated.
Consider now the pass probability of the protocol, pΩ. Either pΩ < EAT, in which case the protocol will
abort with probability at least 1 − EAT, or pΩ ≥ EAT. In the latter case we can replace the unknown pΩ
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Figure 4: A plot of the randomness certified as we vary our choice of min-tradeoff function. At each point ν we
evaluate the certifiable randomness (33) for the corresponding choice of min-tradeoff function fν , numerically
optimizing the parameter β each time. The rough appearance of the surface is a result of finding local
optima in the β optimization. For reference, we include a plot of the asymptotic rate, i.e., (33) as n → ∞
and δ → 0. The protocol parameters used during the calculations are as follows: n = 1010, γ = 5 × 10−3,
ω = (0.49, 0.4225, 0.0875), δCHSH = δalign = 10
−3 and s = EAT = 10−8.
in (25) with EAT as this results in an increase in the error term Ω. The EAT then asserts that
Hsmin(AB|XYE)ρ|Ω > n inf
C∈Ω
fν(FC)− n(V + K)− Ω,
for any choice of min-tradeoff function fν ∈ Fmin.
As the min-tradeoff functions are affine, we can lower bound the infimum for the region of possible scores
specified by the success event,
Ω = {C | γ(ω − δ) < FC(G) < γ(ω + δ)} .
Taking p = (γ(ω − δsgn), (1 − γ)), we have f(p) ≤ infC∈Ω fν(FC). Note that p may not correspond to a
frequency distribution that could have resulted from a successful run of the protocol – it may not even be a
probability distribution. However, it is sufficient for our purposes as an explicit lower bound on the infimum.
Further, noting that fν(p) = gν(ω − δsgn), we can straightforwardly compute this lower bound as
fν(p) = (1− γ) (Aν −Bνλν · (ω − δsgn)) .
Inserting the min-tradeoff function properties (30)–(32) into the the EAT’s error terms [(23)–(25)] we get the
explicit form of the quantities V , K and Ω stated in the lemma.
If the protocol does not abort during the accumulation procedure, the user may proceed by applying
a quantum-proof strong extractor to the concatenated output string AB resulting in a close to uniform
bit-string of length approximately (1− γ)n (Aν −Bνλν · (ω − δsgn))− n(V + K)− Ω.
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Example 3.2: Continuing from Ex. 3.1, we look at the bound on the accumulated entropy specified by (33)
for a range of choices of fν ∈ Fmin. Again, we are considering a quantum implementation with an expected
frequency distribution ω = (0.49, 0.4225, 0.0875). In Fig. 4 we see that our choice of min-tradeoff function
can have a large impact on the quantity of entropy we are able to certify. The plot gives some reassuring
numerical evidence that, for the nonlocal game GCHSH, the certifiable randomness is continuous and concave
in the family parameter ν.
The min-tradeoff function indexed by our expected frequency distribution, fω, is able to certify just
under 0.939-bits per interaction. By applying a gradient-ascent algorithm we were able to improve this to
0.946-bits per interaction. In an attempt to avoid getting stuck within local optima we applied the algorithm
several times, starting subsequent iterations at randomly chosen points close to the current optimum. The
optimization led to an improved min-tradeoff function choice fν∗ , where ν
∗ = (0.491, 0.421, 0.088).
3.3 Protocol QRE
Protocol QRE is the concatenation of the accumulation and extraction sub-procedures. It remains to provide
the formal security statements for a general instance of Protocol QRE. We refer to an untrusted device
network DAB as honest if during each interaction, the underlying quantum state shared amongst the devices
and the measurements performed in response to inputs remain the same (i.e., the devices behave as the
user expects). Furthermore, each interaction is performed independently of all others. The following lemma
provides a bound on the probability that an honest implementation of Protocol QRE aborts.
Lemma 3.4 (Completeness of Protocol QRE): Let Protocol QRE and all of its parameters be as defined in
Fig. 2. Then, the probability that an honest implementation of Protocol QRE aborts is no greater than εcomp
where
εcomp = 2
|G|∑
k=1
e
− γδ
2
k
3ωk
n
. (37)
Proof. During the parameter estimation step of Protocol QRE, the protocol aborts if the observed frequency
distribution FC fails to satisfy
γ(ω − δ) < FC(G) < γ(ω + δ).
Writing FC(G) = (rk)|G|k=1, ω = (ωk)|G|k=1 and δ = (δk)|G|k=1, the probability that an honest implementation of
the protocol aborts can be written as
Pabort = Pr
 |G|⋃
k=1
{∣∣rk − γωk∣∣ ≥ γδk}
 ≤ |G|∑
k=1
Pr
[∣∣rk − γωk∣∣ ≥ γδk] .
Restricting to a single element rk of FC(G), we can model its final value as the binomially distributed
random variable rk ∼ 1nBin (n, γωk). As a consequence of the Chernoff bound (cf. Corollary B.1), and that
δk < ωk, we have
Pr
[∣∣rk − γωk∣∣ ≥ γδk] ≤ 2e− γδ2kn3ωk .
Applying this bound to each element of the sum individually, we arrive at the desired result.
Remark 3.1: The completeness error in the above lemma only considers the possibility of the protocol
aborting during the parameter estimation stage. However, if the initial random seed is a particularly limited
resource then it is possible that the protocol aborts due to seed exhaustion. In Lemma B.4 we analyse a
sampling algorithm required to select the inputs during device interaction. If required, the probability of
failure for that algorithm could be incorporated into the completeness error.
With a secure bound on the quantity of accumulated entropy established by Lemma 3.3 we can apply a
(k, ext+2s)-strong extractor to AB to complete the security analysis. Combined with the input randomness
discussed in Appendix B we arrive at the following theorem.
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Lemma 3.5 (Soundness of Protocol QRE): Let Protocol QRE be implemented with some initial random
seed D of length d. Furthermore let all other protocol parameters be chosen within their permitted ranges, as
detailed in Fig. 2. Then the soundness error of Protocol QRE is
εsound = max(ext + 2s, EAT) .
Proof. Recall from (13) that the soundness error is an upper bound on 12Pr[Ω] · ‖ρZE − τm ⊗ ρE‖1. In the
case Pr [Ω] ≤ EAT, we have 12Pr[Ω] · ‖ρZE − τm ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ EAT.
In the case Pr [Ω] > EAT, Lemma 3.3 gives a bound on the accumulated entropy. Combining with the
definition of a quantum-proof strong extractor Def. 2.5 and noting that the norm is non-increasing under
partial trace we obtain 12Pr[Ω] · ‖ρZE − τm ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ext + 2s, from which the claim follows.
Remark 3.2: By choosing parameters such that EAT ≤ ext + 2s we can take the soundness error to be
ext + 2s.
Combining all of the previous results we arrive at the full security statement concerning Protocol QRE.
Theorem 3.1 (Security of Protocol QRE): Protocol QRE is an (εcomp, εsound)-secure randomness expansion
protocol producing
((1− γ) (Aν −Bνλν · (ω − δsgn))− V − K)n− Ω − `ext (38)
random bits at least εsound-close to uniformly distributed, where εcomp, εsound are given by Lemma 3.4 (cf.
Remark 3.1) and Lemma 3.5.
Remark 3.3: The expected seed length required to execute Protocol QRE is d ≈ (γH(µ) + h(γ))n (cf.
Lemma B.4).
Example 3.3: In Ex. 3.1 and Ex. 3.2 we used the following choice of protocol parameters: n = 1010,
γ = 5× 10−3, δ1 = · · · = δ|G| = 10−3 and s = EAT = 10−8. The resulting implementation of Protocol QRE,
using the nonlocal game GCHSH with an expected frequency distribution ω = (0.49, 0.4225, 0.0875), exhibits
the following statistics.
Quantity Value
Total accumulated entropy before extraction (no abort) 9.46× 109
Expected length of required seed before extraction 5.54× 108
Expected net-gain in entropy (no abort) 8.91× 109 − `ext
Completeness error (εcomp) 8.77× 10−8
4 Examples
In this section we demonstrate the use of our framework through the construction and analysis of several
protocols based on different tests of nonlocality. To this end, we begin by introducing two families of nonlocal
games which we consider alongside GCHSH.
Empirical behaviour game (GEB). The empirical behaviour game (GEB) is a nonlocal game that estimates
the underlying behaviour of DAB , i.e., it attempts to characterise each individual probability p(a, b|x, y). We
may construct this by associating with each input-output tuple (a, b, x, y) ∈ ABXY a corresponding score
cabxy ∈ G and defining the scoring rule
VEB(a, b, x, y) := cabxy,
for each (a, b, x, y) ∈ ABXY. Then, for any input distribution µEB with full support on the alphabets XY,
the collection GEB = (µEB, VEB) forms a nonlocal game. Moreover, for agents playing according to some
strategy p ∈ Q, the expected frequency distribution over the scores is precisely the joint distribution,
ωEB(a, b, x, y) = µEB(x, y)p(a, b|x, y)
= p(a, b, x, y).
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As GEB can be defined for any collection of input-output alphabets, we can indicate the size of these alphabets
as superscripts, i.e., G|X ||Y||A||B|EB . However, since we only consider binary output alphabets in this work, we
will not include their sizes in the superscript, i.e., we will write G23EB instead of G2322EB .
Remark 4.1: The scoring rule for GEB, as defined above, has several redundant components, arising from
normalisation and the no-signalling conditions. In fact, there are only [(|A| − 1)|X |+ 1][(|B| − 1)|Y|+ 1]− 1
free parameters [51]. Knowing this we can reduce the number of scores in our nonlocal game and, in turn,
the number of constraints we impose in our SDPs.16
Joint correlators game (G〈AB〉). Specifically, for each (x, y) ∈ XY we define a score cxy and a scoring rule
V〈AB〉(a, b, x, y) :=
{
cxy if a = b
cnorm otherwise.
That is, for a pair of inputs (x, y) the score is recorded as cxy whenever the agents’ outcomes agree. Otherwise,
they record some normalization score cnorm. The input distribution can then be specified in some way: we
use the uniform distribution over XY. We refer to this game by the symbol G〈AB〉 and, as before, we will
indicate the sizes of the input alphabets with superscripts.
4.1 Rates in the presence of inefficient detectors
We now compare the accumulation rates of protocols built using the nonlocal games described above. We
retain the protocol parameter choices from the previous examples: n = 1010, γ = 5× 10−3 and s = EAT =
10−8, except we now set the confidence interval width parameter to
δk =
√
3ωk ln(2/εcomp)
γn
, (39)
in order to have a similar completeness error εcomp ≈ 10−12 across the different protocols.17
We suppose that the devices operate by using a pure, entangled state of the form
|ψ(θ)〉AB = cos(θ) |00〉+ sin(θ) |11〉 , (40)
for θ ∈ (0, pi/4]. We denote the corresponding density operator by ρθ = |ψ(θ)〉〈ψ(θ)|. For simplicity we restrict
to projective measurements within the x-z plane of the Bloch-sphere, i.e., measurements {Π(ϕ),1 − Π(ϕ)},
with the projectors defined by
Π(ϕ) =
(
cos2(ϕ/2) cos(ϕ/2) sin(ϕ/2)
cos(ϕ/2) sin(ϕ/2) sin2(ϕ/2)
)
(41)
for ϕ ∈ [0, 2pi). We denote the projectors associated with the jth outcome of the ith measurement by Aj|i
and Bj|i. The elements of the devices’ behaviour can then be written as
p(a, b|x, y) = Tr [ρθ(Aa|x ⊗Bb|y)] . (42)
Our analysis is focussed on how the accumulation rates differ when the devices operate with inefficient
detectors. Heralding can be used to account for losses incurred during state transmission and has been used
to develop novel device-independent protocols [52]. However, losses that occur within a user’s laboratory
cannot be ignored without opening a detection loophole [53]. Inefficient detectors are a major contributor to
the total experimental noise, so robustness to inefficient detectors is a necessary property for any practical
randomness expansion protocol. We characterize detection efficiency by a single parameter η ∈ [0, 1], rep-
resenting the (independent) probability with which a measurement device successfully measures a received
16It is important to remove redundant constraints in practice as they can lead to numerical instabilities.
17In practice one would fix the soundness error of the protocol. However, because the soundness error is also dependent on
the extraction phase we instead assume independence of rounds and fix the completeness error.
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(a) G〈AB〉 protocols (b) GEB protocols
(c) Comparison of protocols in the (2, 3)-scenario.
Figure 5: A plot of the asymptotic and EAT-rates for protocols using the nonlocal game families G〈AB〉, GEB
and GCHSH.
state and outputs the result.18 To deal with failed measurements we assign outcome 0 when this occurs.
Combining this with (42), we may write the behaviour as
p(a, b|x, y) = η2Tr [ρθ(Aa|x ⊗Bb|y)]+ (1− η)2δ0aδ0b
+ η(1− η) (δ0aTr [ρθ(1⊗Bb|y)]+ δ0bTr [ρθ(Aa|x ⊗ 1)]) . (43)
For each protocol we consider lower bounds on two quantities: the pre-EAT gain in min-entropy from a
single interaction, Hmin(AB|XY E), and the EAT-rate, Hsmin(AB|XYE)/n. The former quantity, which we
refer to as the asymptotic rate, represents the maximum accumulation rate achievable with our numerical
technique. It is a lower bound on Hsmin(AB|XYE)/n, specified by (33), as n→∞ and γ, δ → 0.19 Comparing
these two quantities gives a clear picture of the amount of entropy that we lose due to the effect of finite
statistics.
18For simplicity, we make the additional assumption that the detection efficiencies are constant amongst all measurement
devices used within the protocol.
19We would really like to plot H(AB|XY E) and the corresponding EAT-rate derived from it. However, in general we do not
have suitable techniques to access these quantities in a device-independent manner.
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Figure 6: Comparison illustrating the EAT-rates (cf. (33)) converging to the asymptotic rates for protocols
based on different nonlocal games. The rates were derived by assuming a qubit implementation of the
protocols with a detection efficiency η = 0.9, optimizing the state and measurement angles in order to
maximise the asymptotic rate. Then, for each value of n we optimized the min-tradeoff function choice and
β parameter and noted the resulting bound on Hsmin. To ensure that we approach the asymptotic rate as n
increased we set γ = δ1 = · · · = δ|G| = n−1/3, resulting in a constant completeness error across all values of
n.
With inefficient detectors, partially entangled states can exhibit larger Bell-inequality violations than
maximally entangled states [54]. To account for this we optimize both the state and measurement angles
at each data point using the iterative optimization procedure detailed in [55]. All programs were relaxed to
the second level of the NPA hierarchy using [56] and the resulting SDPs were computed using the SDPA
solver [57]. The results of these numerics are displayed in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b we see that in both families of protocols considered, an increase in the number of
inputs leads to higher rates. This increase is significant when one moves from the (2, 2)-scenario to the (2, 3)-
scenario. However, continuing this analysis for higher numbers of inputs we find that any further increases
appear to have negligible impact on the overall robustness of the protocol.20 Whilst all of the protocols
achieve asymptotic rates of 2 bits per round when η = 1, their respective EAT-rates at this point differ
substantially. In Fig. 5c we see a direct comparison between protocols from the different families. The plot
shows that, as expected, entropy loss is greater when using the nonlocality test G23EB as opposed to the other
protocols. In particular, for high values of η we find that we would be able to certify a larger quantity of
entropy by considering fewer scores. However, it is still worth noting that this entropy loss could be reduced
by choosing a more generous set of protocol parameters, e.g., increasing n and decreasing δ.
Increasing n can be difficult in practice due to restrictions on the overall runtime of the protocol. Not
only does it take longer to collect the statistics within the device-interaction phase, but it may also increase
the runtime of the extraction phase [58]. In Fig. 6 we observe how quickly the various protocols converge on
their respective asymptotic rates as we increase n. Again we find that, due to the finite-size effect, entropy
loss when using G23EB is greater than that observed in the other protocols. In particular, we see that for
protocols with fewer than 1010 rounds, it is advantageous to use G23〈AB〉. From the perspective of practical
implementation, Fig. 5c and Fig. 6 highlight the benefits of a flexible protocol framework wherein a user can
design protocols tailored to the scenario under consideration.
20This could also be an artefact of the assumed restriction to qubit systems.
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Figure 7: Comparison between the certifiable accumulation rates of QRNE protocols based on GCHSH, G23EB
and Protocol ARV from [14] on qubit systems with inefficient detectors (cf. Fig. 5). The rates of Protocol
ARV are also evaluated using the improved EAT statement [23]. For Protocol ARV, we use the one-sided
von Neumann entropy bound, so the maximum rate is one bit per round, but because we can directly get the
single-round von Neumann entropy, the rate initially falls more slowly with decreasing detection efficiency
than for the other protocols.
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It is also important to compare the rates of instances of Protocol QRE with other protocols from the
literature, in particular the protocol of [14] (ARV). In [14], the min-tradeoff functions are constructed from a
tight bound on the single-party von Neumann entropy, H(A|XE), which is given in terms of a CHSH inequal-
ity violation [35]. In Fig. 7 we compare the rates of ARV with G22〈AB〉 and G23EB for entangled qubit systems
with inefficient detectors. To make our comparison fair, we have also computed the rates for Protocol ARV
using the improved EAT bound21. As the rates of Protocol ARV are derived from the entropy accumulated
by a single party their rates are capped at one bit per round.
In contrast, the semidefinite programs grant us access to bounds on the entropy produced by both parties
and we are therefore able to certify up to two bits per round. In Fig. 7, this advantage is observed in the
high detection efficiency regime. Fig. 7 also highlights a significant drawback of our technique, which stems
from our use of the inequality H(AB|XY E) ≥ Hmin(AB|XY E). In particular, we see that for η < 0.9, the
H(A|XE) bound for the CHSH inequality is already greater than the Hmin(AB|XY E) established for the
empirical behaviour. Therefore, in the asymptotic limit (n→∞) the min-entropy bounds for these protocols
will produce strictly worse rates in this regime. For the finite n we have chosen, n = 1010, it appears
that for the majority of smaller η, it is advantageous to use the ARV protocol over the protocols derived
from the framework. Nevertheless, looking at the threshold detection efficiencies, i.e. the minimal detection
efficiency required to achieve positive rates, we find that some protocols from our framework are able to
again beat the rates established for Protocol ARV. Looking at the inset plot in Fig. 7 we see that G22〈AB〉 has
a smaller threshold efficiency than that of Protocol ARV for the chosen protocol parameters. Interestingly,
this shows that G22〈AB〉 is capable of producing higher rates than Protocol ARV in both the low and the high
detection efficiency regimes, with the improvement for low detection efficiencies being of particular relevance
to experimental implementations. Importantly, this shows that protocols from the framework are of practical
use for finite n in spite of the losses coming from the use of H(AB|XY E) ≥ Hmin(AB|XY E).
Remark 4.2: We have so far considered the only noise to be that caused by inefficient detectors. However,
it is natural to ask how other sources of noise affect our results. By replacing the states used with Werner
states [59], we find that the results remain robust—they remain qualitatively the same, but for small Werner
state noise, all of the graphs shift to slightly lower rates. For this reason we choose not to include the graphs
here.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how to combine device-independent bounds on the guessing probability with the EAT, to
create a versatile method for analysing quantum-secure randomness expansion protocols. The construction
was presented as a template protocol from which an exact protocol can be specified by the user. The
relevant security statements and quantity of output randomness of the derived protocol can then be evaluated
numerically. A Python package [24] accompanies this work to help facilitate implementation of the framework.
In Sec. 4 we illustrated the framework, applying it to several example protocols, with parameters chosen to
reflect the capabilities of current nonlocality tests. We then compared the robustness of these protocols
when implemented on qubit systems with inefficient detectors. Our analyses show that, within a broadly
similar experimental setup, different protocols can have significantly different rates, and hence that it is worth
considering small modifications to a protocol during their design. We also compared the rates of a selection
of our protocols to the protocol presented in [14] (ARV). Interestingly, we found that some of the protocols
from the framework are able to achieve higher rates than Protocol ARV in both the high and low detection
efficiency regimes. In particular, the higher rates for low detection efficiencies is of great importance for
actual experimental implementations.
Although the framework produces secure and robust protocols, there remains scope for further improve-
ments. For example, our work relies on the relation H(AB|XY E) ≥ Hmin(AB|XY E) which is far from
tight. The resulting loss can be seen when one compares the asymptotic rate of GCHSH in Fig. 5c with those
presented in [14] (see Fig. 7). Several alternative approaches could be taken in order to reduce this loss.
21Note that we always use the direct bound on the von Neumann entropy when considering Protocol ARV, rather than forming
a bound via the min-entropy
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Firstly, the above relation is part of a more general ordering of the conditional Re´nyi entropies.22 If one were
able to develop efficient computational techniques for computing device-independent lower bounds on one of
these alternative quantities we would expect an immediate improvement. Furthermore, dimension-dependent
bounds may be applicable in certain situations. For example, it is known that for the special case of n-party,
2-input, 2-output scenarios it is sufficient to restrict to qubit systems [35,51].
Optimizing the choice of min-tradeoff function over Fmin is a non-convex and not necessarily continuous
problem [60]. Our analysis in Sec. 4 used a simple probabilistic gradient ascent algorithm to approach this
problem. We found that for certain protocols, in particular G22EB, the optimization had to be repeated many
times before a good choice of min-tradeoff function was found.
As Fig. 7 shows, the framework is capable of producing protocols that are of immediate relevance to
current randomness expansion experiments. It is therefore a worthwhile endeavour to search for protocols
within the framework that provide high EAT-rates in different parameter regimes. Investigations into the
randomness certification properties of nonlocality tests with larger output alphabets or additional parties
could be of interest. However, increasing either of these parameters is likely to increase the influence of finite-
size effects. Alternatively, one could try to design more economical nonlocality tests by combining scores that
are of a lesser importance to the task of certifying randomness. Intuitively, for a score c ∈ C, the magnitude
of of λ(c) in the min-tradeoff function indicates how important that score is for certifying entropy. If |λ(c)| is
large then this score is ‘important’ in the sense that any small deviations in the expected frequency of that
score, ω(c), will have a large impact on the amount of certifiable entropy. Another approach to designing
good nonlocality tests would be to take inspiration from [20, 21] wherein the authors showed how to derive
the optimal Bell-expressions for certifying randomness. A nonlocal game could then be designed to encode
the constraints imposed by this optimal Bell-expression. An example of such a game would be to assign a
score +1 to all (ABXY ) that have a positive coefficient in the optimal Bell-expression and a score of −1 to
all those with negative coefficients. The input distribution of the nonlocal game could then be chosen as such
to encode the relative weights of the coefficients.
Finally, our computational approach to the EAT considered only the task of randomness expansion. Our
work could be extended to produce security proofs for other device-independent tasks. Given that the EAT
has already been successfully applied to a wide range of problems [36, 62–65], developing good methods for
robust min-tradeoff function constructions represents an important step towards practical device-independent
security.
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A Table of parameters and notation
Notation Description Initial reference
D A collection of untrusted devices. Section 2.3
G A nonlocal game. Definition 2.1
QG Set of expected frequency distributions on G using quantum strategies. Section 2.3
Q(k)G Set of expected frequency distributions on G using strategies from Q(k). Section 2.3
ν,ω Expected frequency distributions over scores of a nonlocal game. Equation 11
p
(k)
guess, d
(k)
guess Solutions to the k-relaxed primal and dual guessing probability programs. Program 9 and 10
λν Feasible point of the dual guessing probability program with parameter ν. Section 2.3
δ Vector of statistical confidence interval widths. Equation 16.
δsgn δ with elements signed in accordance with a given λ. Lemma 3.3
A,B Devices’ output alphabets. Section 2.1
X ,Y Devices’ input alphabets. Section 2.1
n ∈ N Number of rounds in the device-interaction phase. Section 2.5.1
γ ∈ (0, 1) Probability that any given round is a test round. Section 2.5.1
Ai, Bi Devices’ outputs for the i
th round. Section 2.5.1
Xi, Yi Devices’ inputs for the i
th round. Section 2.5.1
Ci EAT-score for the i
th round. Section 2.5.1
FC Frequency distribution induced by score transcript C = (C1, . . . , Cn). Equation 15
Ω Event that the protocol does not abort. Equation 16
Rext Strong quantum-secure randomness extractor. Definition 2.5
εcomp Completeness error of Protocol QRE. Lemma 3.4
εsound Soundness error of Protocol QRE. Lemma 3.5
εs Smoothing parameter for Hmin. Equation 7
EAT Tolerance of unlikely success events. Lemma 3.3.
V EAT error term (Variance). Theorem 2.1
K EAT error term (Remainder). Theorem 2.1
Ω EAT error term (Pass probability). Theorem 2.1
ext Extractor error. Definition 2.5
`ext Entropy lost during extraction. Section 2.6
B Input Randomness
Here we quantify the length of the initial random seed required to execute an instance of Protocol QRE.
This supply of random bits is necessary for selecting the devices’ inputs and seeding the extractor. In the
forthcoming analysis we ignore the latter as this quantity depends on the choice of extractor. Instead, we look
at the process of converting a uniform private seed into device inputs required for running Protocol QRE. We
follow a similar procedure to that used in [14], modifying the algorithm slightly in order to extract explicit
bounds.
B.1 Statistical bounds
We begin by stating some standard statistical bounds. The first is commonly known as the Chernoff
bound [66], although we take our formulation from [67]. This provides a convenient bound on the devi-
ation of the sum of random variables from the expected value.
Lemma B.1 (Chernoff bound): Let Xi be independent binary random variables for i = 1, . . . , n, S =
∑
iXi
and µ = E [S]. Then for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
Pr [S ≥ (1 + t)µ] ≤ e−t2µ/3
Pr [S ≤ (1− t)µ] ≤ e−t2µ/2 .
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Corollary B.1: For r ≤ µ we have Pr [|S − µ| ≥ r] ≤ 2e−r2/(3µ).
In addition to this, we also make use of Hoeffding’s inequality [68].
Lemma B.2 (Hoeffding’s inequality): Let Xi be independent random variables, such that ai ≤ Xi ≤ bi with
ai, bi ∈ R for i = 1, . . . , n. In addition, let S =
∑
iXi and µ = E [S]. Then for t > 0
Pr [|S − µ| ≥ t] ≤ 2e−
2t2∑
i(bi−ai)2
B.2 Rounded interval algorithm
The interval algorithm provides an efficient method for simulating the sampling of some target random
variable T using another random variable S. To aid understanding of our modification to this algorithm and
any subsequent results we shall briefly explain how this simulation works. For simplicity we restrict ourselves
to the scenario where S is a sequence of uniformly distributed bits, we denote the uniform distribution on an
alphabet of size 2k by U2k , for k ∈ N.
The distribution of the target random variable T forms a partition of the unit interval, one subinterval
for each outcome t of T . In exactly the same way, the probability distribution for U2k partitions the unit
interval into 2k subintervals. Thus, we can associate a bit-string with its corresponding subinterval, defined
by this partitioning. The interval algorithm works by using an increasing sequence of random bits and the
corresponding subintervals that the sequence defines. Once the subinterval generated by the sequence of bits
is contained inside one of the subintervals defined by the target random variable T , say t, then we say that
we have simulated the sampling of t from T and the algorithm terminates. Denoting by N the length of seed
required for the interval algorithm to terminate, then by [69, Theorem 3] we have
E [N ] ≤ H(T ) + 3. (44)
As the algorithm stands, the maximum value that N can take is unbounded (although the probability
that the algorithm expends the seed without terminating decreases exponentially in N). In order to produce
large deviation bounds on the number of bits required to execute our protocol, we place an upper limit on the
maximum seed length. We thus use an adapted sampling procedure, the rounded interval algorithm (RIA),
which forcefully terminates if the seed length reaches the upper bound of kmax bits.
Should the RIA fail to terminate after kmax steps, then the output sequence generated will correspond
to some subinterval I(r) = [ r
2kmax
, r+1
2kmax
), for some r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2kmax − 1}, that is not entirely contained
within one of the subintervals induced by T . If this occurs, we round down: selecting the interval It for which
r
2kmax
∈ It.
Remark B.1: Note that the above procedure depends on the ordering of the intervals generated by T (which
should be fixed before sampling). One could imagine a rather pathological scenario where an ordering places
extremely unlikely outcomes over rounding points, greatly increasing their simulated outcome probabilities.
However, as will be shown in Lemma B.3, the distance between the simulated random variable and the target
random variable decreases exponentially in kmax.
Remark B.2: The rounding procedure truncates the maximum seed length, N ≤ kmax, and as such, it is
clear that the inequality (44) also holds for the RIA.
Definition B.1 (Statistical distance): Given two random variables X and X ′, taking values in some common
alphabet X . The statistical distance between X and X ′, is defined by
∆(X,X ′) :=
1
2
∑
x∈X
|pX(x)− pX′(x)|. (45)
Lemma B.3: Let T be a random variable taking values in some alphabet T . Let T ′ be the distribution
sampled using the RIA with target distribution T . Then
∆(T, T ′) ≤ |T | 2−(kmax+1),
where kmax is the maximum number of input bits that can be used by the RIA.
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Proof. Consider the partitions of the unit interval {I(t)}t∈T and {I ′(t)}t∈T corresponding to the distributions
pT and qT ′ of T and T
′ respectively. The intervals of T ′ take the form
I ′(t) =
⋃
r
[
r
2kmax
,
r + 1
2kmax
)
where the (potentially empty) union is taken over all r ∈ N0 such that r2−kmax ∈ I(t). The intervals within
the union are either contained fully within the corresponding outcome interval of T , i.e.,
[
r
2kmax
, r+1
2kmax
) ⊆ I(t),
or they are included as a result of rounding. Thus we may write
|I ′(t)| = |{r | r · 2−kmax ∈ I(t), r ∈ N0}|2−kmax .
By a straightforward counting argument, there are at least
⌊|I(t)|2kmax⌋ such values of r, and at most⌈|I(t)|2kmax⌉. We hence have
|I(t)|2kmax − 1 ≤ |I ′(t)|2kmax ≤ |I(t)|2kmax + 1,
and therefore
|pT (t)− pT ′(t)| ≤ 2−kmax ,
holds for all t ∈ T . Applying this bound to each term within the ∆(T, T ′) sum completes the proof.
B.3 Input randomness for Protocol QRE
Following the structure of Protocol QRE, we look to use the RIA to sample the devices’ inputs for each
round. In adherence with the Markov-chain condition (Def. 2.3), the natural procedure would be to sample
at the beginning of each round. However, in practice this requires a much larger seed: because of (44) and the
property H(Tn) = nH(T ), by sampling the joint distribution the expected saving is about 3n bits compared
to repeating a single sample n times. Fortunately, this joint sampling can be implemented while maintaining
the Markov-chain condition. Within the assumptions of Protocol QRE we allow the honest parties access
to a trusted classical computer, which would also contain some trusted data storage—we assume that the
parties can record their outcome strings without leakage. Therefore, using their trusted classical computer,
the honest parties perform the RIA: sampling the random variables (Xn1 , Y
n
1 ) and subsequently storing the
outcome on the trusted classical computer’s harddrive. Crucially, the assumption that the user can prevent
unwanted communication between devices implies this can all be done without any information leaking to
the untrusted devices. Then, at the beginning of round i, the inputs (Xi, Yi) are sent from the classical
computer to the respective devices. By conducting the protocol in this manner we retain the Markov chain
conditions—the inputs are sampled independently of the devices and furthermore, when the devices produce
their outputs for the ith round they can only have knowledge of the inputs for this round and all previous.
Due to potential computational constraints and to permit large deviation bounds on the number of bits
required we will not assume that all n rounds are sampled at once. Instead, we split the n rounds into at
most dn/me blocks of size m and apply the RIA to sample the inputs of each block separately. For simplicity,
we assume that n/m ∈ N and henceforth remove the ceiling function from the analysis.
Recall that for the ith round, the user first uses Ti to decide whether the round is a test round, and, if so,
they choose inputs according to the nonlocal game input distribution µ. Otherwise, if Ti = 0, they supply
their devices with the fixed inputs x˜ and y˜. The probability mass function of joint random variables XiYiTi,
representing the ith round’s inputs, is therefore
Pr [(Xi, Yi, Ti) = (xi, yi, ti)] =

γ µ(x, y) for (xi, yi, ti) = (x, y, 1),
(1− γ) for (xi, yi, ti) = (x˜, y˜, 0)
0 otherwise
. (46)
Following (44), if M is the seed length required to sample one of the m blocks of rounds, then we have
E [M ] ≤ (γH(µ) + h(γ))n
m
+ 3 (47)
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where H(µ) is the Shannon entropy of the distribution µ and h(·) is the binary entropy.
The following lemma gives a probabilistic bound on the total length of the random seed required to sample
the inputs for the devices.23
Lemma B.4: Let the parameters of Protocol QRE be as defined in Fig. 2 and let kmax ∈ N be the maximum
permitted seed length for an instance of the RIA. Then, with probability greater than (1− RIA), we can use
m instances of the RIA to simulate the sampling of every device input required to execute Protocol QRE with
a uniform seed of length no greater than Nmax, where
Nmax = 2κ (48)
RIA = e
−2κ2/mk2max (49)
and κ = (γH(µ) + h(γ))n+ 3m. Moreover, the sampled distribution lies within a statistical distance of
dist = m 2
n log(supp(µ)+1)/m−(kmax+1), (50)
from the target distribution, where supp(µ) := |{(x, y) ∈ XY | µ(x, y) > 0}|.
Proof. Consider the sequence (Mi)
m
i=1 of i.i.d. random variables representing the number of random bits
required to choose the inputs for the ith block and the corresponding random sum N =
∑m
i=1Mi. By (47),
the expected number of bits required to select all of the inputs for the protocol can be bounded above by
κ = (γH(µ) + h(γ))n + 3m. Using Hoeffding’s inequality, we can bound the probability that N greatly
exceeds this value,
Pr [N ≥ κ+ t] ≤ e−2t2/mk2max ,
for some t > 0. Setting t = κ this becomes
Pr [N ≥ 2κ] ≤ e−2κ2/mk2max .
Although κ is not exactly the expected value of N , which is the quantity appearing in Hoeffding’s bound,
the bound holds because κ ≥ E [N ].
It remains to bound the statistical distance between the sampled random variable I′ = (X′,Y′,T′) and
the target random variable I = (X,Y,T). For each block of rounds, the corresponding random variable Ii
can take one of a possible (supp(µ) + 1)n/m different values. Therefore, by Lemma B.3, we have for the ith
block of rounds
∆(Ii, I
′
i) ≤ (supp(µ) + 1)n/m2−(kmax+1)
= 2n log(supp(µ)+1)/m−(kmax+1)
Since ∆(W,V ) is a metric and hence satisfies the triangle inequality [70], the statistical distance between
independently repeated samples can grow no faster than linearly, i.e., ∆(Im, I ′m) ≤ m∆(I, I ′). This completes
the proof.
C Incorporating the blocking procedure of [14]
The original statement of the entropy accumulation theorem [13] was released alongside an accompanying
paper, [14], which detailed its application to security proofs of device-independent protocols. Within the
appendix of [14] it was shown that one could increase the quantity of entropy certified by the original EAT
by modifying the structure of the protocol. In particular, this demonstrated the original EAT statement’s
suboptimal dependence on the testing probability. In light of this, the authors of [23] improved the second
order term of the EAT in order to account for this suboptimal dependence. In the sections that follow, we
will look at how the modified protocol structure interacts with the improved EAT statement. We begin by
showing how the family of min-tradeoff functions Fmin can be adapted to this structural change and then
we show that the modified protocol structure provides no clear benefits when used with the improved EAT
statement. In addition, we provide some comparison plots showing the accumulation rates achievable with
the different structures and EAT statements. To clearly distinguish the different statements of the EAT, we
shall indicate with the subscript DFR16, quantities associated with the original EAT [13] and similarly we
shall indicate with the subscript DF18, quantities associated with the EAT with improved second-order [23].
23We do not include the extractor’s seed here as its size will depend on the choice of extractor.
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C.1 Construction
Let us briefly review the structural modification that was introduced in [14]. Instead of distinguishing the
statistics from each interaction separately, rounds are grouped together to form blocks. The number of rounds
within a block can vary: a new block begins when either a test-round occurs or when the maximum number
of rounds permitted within a block, smax, is reached. On expectation there are s¯ =
1−(1−γ)smax
γ rounds within
a block. The device-interaction phase of the protocol concludes after some specified number of blocks m ∈ N
have terminated. We shall use the superscripts R and B to indicate whether a quantity is concerned with
the round-by-round or block structured protocols respectively.
The collected information is now defined at the level of blocks and not rounds. In particular, at the end of
the ith block the user records some tuple (Ai,Bi,Xi,Yi, Ci), where (Ai,Bi,Xi,Yi) ∈ AsmaxBsmaxX smaxYsmax
and the score’s alphabet remains the same, Ci ∈ G ∪ {⊥}. The EAT-channels are also defined for each block
and the entropy bounding property (cf. (17)) that the min-tradeoff functions must satisfy becomes
fBmin(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=τp
H(AiBi|XiYiR′)Ni(σ), (51)
for each i ∈ [m]. The set of distributions compatible with the protocol structure (cf. (18)) now take the form
pB =
(
γs¯q
(1− γ)smax
)
(52)
for q ∈ QG .
Lemma C.1 (Blocked variant of Lemma 3.1): Let g : PG → R be an affine function satisfying
g(q) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci=τp
H(AiBi|XiYiR′)Ni(σ) (53)
for all q ∈ QG. Then the function f : PG∪{⊥} → R, defined by its action on trivial distributions
f(ec) = Max[g] +
g(ec)−Max[g]
γs¯
, ∀c ∈ G,
f(e⊥) = Max[g],
is a min-tradeoff function for any EAT-channels implementing Protocol QREB. Furthermore, f satisfies the
following properties:
Max[f ] = Max[g],
Min[f |Γ] ≥ Min[g],
Var[f |Γ] ≤
(Max[g]−Min[g])2
γs¯
.
Proof. This follows from replicating the original proof [23] with the block channels decomposed into the
testing and generation channels, Ni = γs¯N testi + (1− γs¯)N geni .
Lemma C.2 (Blocked min-tradeoff construction): Let G be a nonlocal game and k ∈ N. For each ν ∈ Q(k)G ,
let λν be some feasible point of Prog. (10). Furthermore, let λmax = maxc∈G λν(c) and λmin = minc∈G λν(c).
Then, for any set of EAT channels {Ni}mi=1 implementing an instance of Protocol QREB with the nonlocal
game G, the set of functionals FBmin(G) = {fν(·) | ν ∈ Q(k)G } forms a family of min-tradeoff functions, where
fν : PC → R are defined by their actions on trivial distributions
fν(ec) := (1− γ) s¯
(
Aν −Bν λν · ec − (1− γs¯)λmin
γs¯
)
for c ∈ G, (54)
and
fν(e⊥) := (1− γ) s¯ (Aν −Bν λmin) , (55)
where Aν =
1
ln 2 − log(λν · ν) and Bν = 1λν ·ν ln 2 .
Moreover, these min-tradeoff functions satisfy the following identities.
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• Maximum:
Max[fν ] = (1− γ)s¯(Aν −Bν λmin) (56)
• Γ-Minimum:
Min[fν |Γ] ≥ (1− γ)s¯(Aν −Bν λmax) (57)
• Γ-Variance:
Var[fν |Γ] ≤
(1− γ)2s¯B2ν(λmax − λmin)2
γ
(58)
Proof. The proof follows the same structure as the proof of Lemma 3.2. The only significant difference is
the construction of the function g : PG → R satisfying (53) so we shall explain this part here. Following
Appendix B of [14], by repeated application of the chain rule we may decompose a block’s entropy as
H(AiBi|XiYiTiR′)Ni(σ) =
smax∑
j=1
(1− γ)j−1H(Ai,jBi,j |XiYi,T j−1i,1 = 0,T smaxi,j A j−1i,1 B j−1i,1 R′),
where Ti,j is the random variable indicating whether a test occurred on the j
th round of the ith block.
Considering the individual terms within the sum, we can absorb the majority of the side information into
some arbitrary quantum register E leaving us with terms of the form
(1− γ)j−1H(Ai,jBi,j |Xi,jYi,jTi,jE).
As before, we can use the inequality H(A|B) ≥ Hmin(A|B) and conditioning on Ti,j to lower bound each
term in the sum by the outputs of the semidefinite program,
(1− γ)j−1H(Ai,jBi,j |Xi,jYi,jTi,jE) = (1− γ)j−1Pr [Ti,j = 0]H(Ai,jBi,j |Xi,j = x˜, Yi,j = y˜, Ti,j = 0,E)
+ (1− γ)j−1Pr [Ti,j = 1]H(Ai,jBi,j |Xi,jYi,jTi,j = 1 E)
≥ (1− γ)jH(Ai,jBi,j |x˜ y˜E)
≥ (1− γ)jHmin(Ai,jBi,j |x˜ y˜E)
≥ −(1− γ)j log(λν · ωi,j),
where ωi,j ∈ QG is the expected frequency distribution over the games scores for round j of block i. Noting
that − log(·) of a linear function is convex, we can establish a bound on the entire block i through an
application of Jensen’s inequality
(γ − 1)
smax∑
j=1
(1− γ)j−1 log(λν · ωi,j) ≥ s¯(γ − 1) log
(
λν ·
∑smax
j=1 (1− γ)j−1ωi,j
s¯
)
= s¯(γ − 1) log (λν · ωi) ,
we have used the fact that
∑
j∈[smax](1 − γ)j−1 = s¯ and that ωi =
∑
j∈[smax] γ(1−γ)
j−1ωi,j
γs¯ is the normalised
expected frequency distribution over the nonlocal game scores for the ith block. Taking a first-order expansion
of the last line, we get the function gν( · ) = (1 − γ)s¯ (Aν −Bνλν · ( · )). The proof is then completed by
applying the extension Lemma C.1, analogous to the technique of Lemma 3.2.
C.2 Blocking with the improved second order
The error term in the original EAT bound is
RDFR16 := 2 (log(1 + 2|A||B|) + d‖∇fmin‖∞e)
√
1− 2 log(sEAT). (59)
The disadvantage of using this bound as-is is that the gradient of fmin scales like 1/γ and so the total error
scales as O(
√
n/γ). Collating the statistics into m ∈ N blocks, allows some of the γ dependence from the
gradient term to be transferred to the log(1 + 2|A||B|) term. Moving to the blocked structure and setting
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smax = d1/γe (as was done in [14]), the output alphabets grow exponentially with the size of the block and
the logarithmic term acquires a 1/γ scaling. In contrast, the scaling of the derivative of the min-tradeoff
function is found to be independent of the block size. Fortunately, as our error is defined for an entire block,
we reduce the multiplicative factor on the total error from
√
n to
√
m ≈√n/s¯. As s¯ ∈ O(1/γ), we find that
the total error term now scales as
√
n/γ. By increasing the size of the blocks we have effectively redistributed
the testing probability dependence evenly amongst the components of DFR16.
In [23], the authors looked to amend this deficiency by strengthening the second order term in the EAT.
The following short calculation looks at how the errors scale when we applying the blocking procedure to the
improved EAT statement. Recall the error terms
RV :=
β ln 2
2
(
log
(
2|AB|2 + 1)+√Var[f |Γ] + 2)2 , (60)
RK :=
β2
6(1− β)3 ln 2 2
β(log |AB|+Max[f ]−Min[ f |Γ]) ln3
(
2log |AB|+Max[f ]−Min[ f |Γ] + e2
)
(61)
and
RΩ :=
1
β
(1− 2 log(pΩ s)) . (62)
Using the explicit form of the blocked min-tradeoff functions Lemma C.2, we can calculate the asymptotic
growth of the error terms as smax →∞, γ → 0 and m ≈ nR/s¯. In particular, we find
m · BV ≤
βm ln 2
2
(
log
(
2|AB|2smax + 1)+√ (1− γ)2s¯B2ν(λmax − λmin)2
γ
+ 2
)2
= O(βnsmax) +O(βn/γ),
(63)
m · BK ≤
mβ2
6(1− β)3 ln 2 2
β(log |AB|smax+(1−γ)s¯Bν(λmax−λmin)) ln3
(
2log |AB|
smax+(1−γ)s¯Bν(λmax−λmin) + e2
)
= β22O(βsmax)O(ns2max),
(64)
BΩ = O(1/β), (65)
and therefore the total error scales as
BDF18 = O
(
βnsmax +
βn
γ
+ β2ns2max2
O(βsmax) +
1
β
)
. (66)
In order for BK to have any sensible scaling, we need the exponent to grow no faster than O(1). Combining
this with the inverse dependence of β in BΩ , we would like β ≈
√
γ√
nsmax
. Such a choice results in BDF18 ∈
O
(
smax
√
n/γ
)
which suggests that indeed, the blocking procedure is no longer advantageous when used in
conjunction with the improved second order statement.
A comparison between the expansion rates obtained when using the improved second order statement [23]
and the blocked variant of the original EAT are presented in Fig. 8. The faster convergence to the asymptotic
rate is indicative of the new EAT statement’s strength.
D Conic program duality
In this section we outline the duality statements for conic programs, introduce the alternative form of dual
that we use in this paper and show that it has the required properties to be considered a dual.
Definition D.1: A cone is a set K ⊆ Rn with the property that if x ∈ K then λx ∈ K for all λ ≥ 0. A cone
is pointed if K ∩ (−K) = ∅.
Definition D.2: Given a cone K, its dual cone is the set K∗ ⊆ Rn defined by the property that y ∈ K∗ if
and only if 〈y, x〉 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K, i.e., K∗ = {y : 〈y, x〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K}.
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Figure 8: Comparison of the certifiable accumulation rates using the two different statements of the EAT:
DFR16B [14] and DF18R (33). The rates were derived using the following procedure. We assumed a qubit
implementation of the protocols with a detection efficiency η = 0.9, optimizing the state and measurement
angles in order to maximise the asymptotic rate. Then, for each value of n an optimization of the min-tradeoff
function choice was performed – for the rates calculated using (33) we also optimized the β parameter at
each value of n. To ensure that we approached the asymptotic rate as n increased we set γ = δ1 = · · · =
δ|G| = n−1/3 as such a choice provides a constant completeness error across all values of n.
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Definition D.3: A proper cone is a cone that is closed, convex, pointed and non-empty.
Definition D.4 (Dual for conic programs): Let K ⊆ Rn be a proper cone with dual K∗, M ∈ Rm×n, b ∈ Rm
and consider the conic program
min
x∈Rn
〈c, x〉 subj. to Mx = b, x ∈ K .
The optimization
max
y∈Rm,z∈Rn
〈b, y〉 subj. to c = z +MT y, z ∈ K∗
is the dual program.
Note that this is a conic program over K∗, the dual cone to K.
The following two Lemmas are standard results (see, for example [71])
Lemma D.1 (Weak duality): Let P be a conic program with optimum value p∗. If the program D, dual to
P has optimum d∗ then p∗ ≥ d∗.
Lemma D.2 (Strong duality): Let P be a conic program with optimum value p∗ and dual D. If P is strictly
feasible then p∗ = d∗.
Consider a family of conic programs parameterized by b, denoted P (b), with optimum p∗(b). Say that b
is valid if there exists some x ∈ K such that Mx = b, and denote by B the set of valid b. Consider now the
program D˜(b) defined by
max
y∈Rm
〈b, y〉 subj. to p∗(b′) ≥ 〈y, b′〉 ∀b′ ∈ B
Lemma D.3: If P (b) has optimum p∗(b) and D˜(b) has optimum d˜∗(b), then d˜∗(b) ≤ p∗(b). Furthermore, if
P (b) is strictly feasible, then d˜∗(b) = p∗(b) = d∗(b).
Proof. For the first part, note that the set of constraints in D˜ include p∗(b) ≥ 〈y, b〉, so d˜∗(b) ≤ p∗(b).
For the second part, consider the dual problem D(b) and write the constraint as c −MT y ∈ K∗. Take
the inner product of c −MT y with x∗(b′) (the optimal argument for the primal with parameter b′ ∈ B) to
give 〈c, x∗(b′)〉 − 〈MT y, x∗〉 = p∗(b′)− 〈y,Mx∗〉 = p∗(b′)− 〈y, b′〉. Since c−MT y ∈ K∗, from x∗(b′) ∈ K we
have that p∗(b′) − 〈y, b′〉 ≥ 0. Thus, for any b′ ∈ B we have 〈y∗(b), b′〉 ≤ p∗(b′). The constraints in D thus
imply those in D˜ and so d˜∗(b) ≥ d∗(b). If P (b) is strictly feasible then by strong duality, p∗(b) = d∗(b), so,
combining with the first part, d˜∗(b) = p∗(b) = d∗(b).
Remark D.1: The previous lemma implies that we can think of D˜ as an alternative dual to P .
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